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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
From October of 1920 to January of 1922, the sheep-
raising territory of Santa Cruz, at the southernmost tip of
Argentine Patagonia became the scene of violent labor disorders
which pitted a largely foreign-born laboring population against
a largely foreign-born proprietary group . The
. Santa Cruz
strikes were part of a general wave of labor unrest which swept
Argentina at the close of World War I. The most severe incidents,
like the Santa Cruz strikes, affected the vital export sector.
The Radical president
,
Hipolito ^Yrigoyen, who had entered office
in 19l6 appearing to favor an official reconciliation with
organized labor, found himself uncomfortably poised between the
contending forces of labor and export interests. Yrigoyen's
response to this wave of labor disorder has been one of the most
controversial aspects of his presidency.
Regarding the Santa Cruz strikes, themselves, the sharply
cont radi ctory versions of what occurred still arouse partisan
feeling. Amidst the continuing debate, there is one point of
agreement: Yrigoyen's handling of these strikes and others of
the period, provides insight into the play of political forces,
both domestic and international, during the era of Radical Party
dominance
.
While a variety of political considerations shaped the
Radical government's response to the strikes, the conditions
which gave rise to the labor unrest in Santa Cruz resulted from
decades of official neglect of the territory's development. The
lackadaisical approach to the distribution of public lands
typified this neglect. During the final decades of the nine-
teenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, the public
domain had been marked off on maps in checker-board style without
reference to topography or prevailing climatic conditions and
then offered for sale or lease. The varying quality of the land
and the need for each rancher to possess both winter and summer
pasturage were ignored. Limitations on individual landholdings
were enacted but not enforced. The rough and tumble grab for
land that ensued favored those with capital who were willing to
brave the wind-swept plains.
The results of the government's failure to adopt a land
distribution policy that responded to local conditions and also
to the aspirations of native-born Argentines seeking an opportuni-
ty for a better life were apparent in the censuses of 191^ and
1920.* In each of the five administrative divisions of the
territory, persons of foreign birth outnumbered the native-born
by a margin of more than two to one. Furthermore , since census
figures included all children born on Argentine soil regardless
of parentage, as Argentine, the actual role of the Argentine in
the settlement of Santa Cruz was even less significant. Only one
out of every four or five adult males in the territory was
Argentine -born.**
*Appendix I **Appendix II
3.
The only exception to this pattern was found in the
northernmost district, that of Deseado, where the national
government had payed some belated attention to land policy. By
provision of Law 5559 of 1908, the government had made available
medium-sized parcels of grazing land. In addition, a railway
was constructed which linked these properties to the coast. These
conditions proved more favorable to Argentine settlement than had
the earlier approach, as the figures indicate. Yet, a German
geographer familiar with the territory, described Deseado as
containing by far the poorest lands in Santa Cruz . ^ As one moved
southward onto more fertile lands, the size of the average holding
increased, and the amount of investment per hectare also increased,
but the proportion of Argentines holding land decreased.* The
official neglect had made the Argentine a stepchild in Santa Cruz.
Another indication of the failure to create conditions
favorable to the permanent settlement of Santa Cruz was the
numerical imbalance between the sexes. The general predominance
of males in the immigrant population, and the absence of economic
opportunities for women in the territory would seem to account for
this phenomenon. Whatever the reason the inability of the average
ranch worker to enjoy normal family life emerged during the strikes
as an underlying grievance.
The years of neglect and haphazard development resulted in
an exceedingly fragile economy. The settlers had concentrated, to
*Appendix III
1
L\xtz Witte, "Consideraciones economicas sobre la patagonia
austral" in Sociedad Cientifica Alemana, Patagonia V. II (Buenos
Aires, 1917) pp. 391-3.
the exclusion of other activities
, on the raising of sheep and
the export of its by-products: meat, tallow, and especially
wool. Residents of the territory were obliged to import food-
stuffs
,
fuel
,
and building supplies, all at great cost.
Ironically, local consumption of several commodities could have
2been met, at least in part, by local production. Lumber was
plentiful in the Andean mountains to the west, and outcroppings
of coal were known to exist in the southwestern corner of the
territory. The well-watered valleys in the Andean foothills
might have been farmed intensively to provide dairy and vegetable
staples. Instead, the fertile Andean zone, like the rest of
Santa Cruz, was divided into huge lots and grazed by sheep.
From 1900 to 1918, the national government had permitted the
settlers of Santa Cruz to trade directly with Europe rather than
having to import via the entrepo/t of Buenos Aires. Seeking to
increase customs revenues and perhaps foster some degree of
import substitution, Yrigoyen withdrew this privilege in 1918.
The net result was higher prices for a number of essential
3
commodities purchased by the residents of Santa Cruz.
The timing of Yrigoyen f s removal of trading privileges co-
incided with the heyday of the wool export industry of the terri-
tory. Demand for wool by the Allies had created a boom, which
was immediately followed by a collapse in the international wool
2 Ibid . U02-U0U.
3Edelmiro Correa Falcon, De la llanura, del bosoue y de la
montana. (Buenos Aires, 1966), p. U7-53.
5.
market.* The full effects of the rising prices for imported
goods and a falling price for Santa Cruz 1 major export commodity
were soon felt. Faced with a falling price for vool after 1919,
the producers in Santa Cruz responded "by increasing rather than
decreasing production. The results were bankrupt ci es and un-
employment. Several small to medium-sized producers who had
become overextended during the boom years were forced to sell
ktheir lands to larger neighbors.
Thus, severe economic recession was the backdrop to the
labor unrest that developed in Santa Cruz after 1920. Twenty-five
years of haphazard settlement had significantly excluded the
native-born Argentine while it left the dominant immigrant popula-
tion divided both socially and economically. Economic stagnation
added to the accumulated frustration of an already harsh existence
*Appendix IV
*Ibid. 28-30. Sociedad, UoU. Col. Jose Maria Sarobe , La
Patagonia y sus problemas . (Buenos Aires, 1935), 138.
CHAPTER II
THE FIRST STRIKE
The history of organized labor in Santa Cruz was a short
one prior to the outbreak of the first strike in late 1920. The
origin of the movement lay, in part, with the arrival of dock-
workers and railway men who were organized els ewhere . In addi-
tion, unions in Santa Cruz received a strong stimulus from the
turbulent labor movement in the neighboring Chilean territory of
Magallanes. In late 1918, a strike of railwaymen and stevedores
in Deseado was crushed by police intervention and by the
employers 1 threats to import strike breakers.^"
Simultaneous to the strike in Deseado was a general strike
in Magallanes, which proved harder to suppress. There, ranch
laborers had joined with transport workers in a work stoppage
that lasted from December 1918 well into February of the following
year. Sporadic violence accompanied this strike. In late
January , the governor of Magallanes contacted his counterpart in
Santa Cruz to despatch forces to help bolster the Chilean
carabineros . Diego Ritchie, a rancher of mixed Argentine and
British parentage who served as chief of Santa Cruz' territorial
2
police, immediately departed for Magallanes with forty men.
Sebastian Marotta, Movimi en to sindical argent i no . Ill
(Buenos Aires, 1973) p. 200.
2Col. Jose Rodriguez, Riquezas y bellezas australes . (Buenos
A £ —_ ~. t n O T ,\ t-n 1 £ ft _ 1 7 S _
7.
This official cooperation in order to crush the unions in
Magallanes led to a parallel cooperation between the leadership
Of organized labor on both sides of the international boundary.
Veterans of the Magallanes strike sought safety in Santa Cruz
once the authorities had gained control of the situation. In
1919, the governments of Argentina and Chile recognized the need
for continued cooperation along the boundary by formalizing their
understanding in a diplomat i c protocol.
In 1920, trade union activity in Santa Cruz intensified. In
January of that year, groups of workers on the docks and in the
hotels and stores of Rio Gal legos formed the Workingmen ' s Society.
In J uly , this, group struck for higher wages. Diego Ritchie
arrested the Workingmen 1 s Society ' s leaders, Antonio Soto and
Baltazar Lorido and charged them with fomenting revolution. Soto,
who was the recognized instigator of the strike, had arrived only
months before, traveling with a theatrical troupe from which he
separated. To Ritchie's surprise, he was quickly ordered to
release the two prisoners by the judicial authority of the terri-
tory, Judge Ismael P. Vinas. Vinas, himself, was a recent
arrival to Santa Cruz. The Radical Admin i s t r at ion had appointed
him to the sole judicial position in the territory, apparently
because of his loyalty to the Radical Party. After Vinas 1 action,
the strike ended in a partial success for the Workingmen f s
Society
.
3Congreso de la Nacion. Camara de Senadores. Diario de
sesiones . 1920. I, pp. 628-30.
• 1
Osvaldo Bayer, Los vengadores de la patagonia tragica . I
(Buenos Aires, 1968) pp. 71-79-
8.
Ritchie protested Vinas intervention to Edelmiro Correa
who was serving as acting governor since the removal of the
incumbent for malfeasance the previous years. Correa in turn
made these views known to his superiors in Buenos Aires and
requested federal forces to assist the police in preventing any
further labor trouble. In mid- September, however, Correa was
formally replaced by an appointee of the Administration, Angel
Yza, a retired naval officer. Yza, a man associated with
Radicalism, was not to assume actual control of the territorial
administration until February of 1921 . Thus Correa and Ritchie
were allowed to remain in their offices on an interim basis but
without enjoying the confidence of the national authorities.
Aware of the split among territorial officials , and particu-
larly of Correa 1 s and Ritchie's vulnerability, the Workingmen 1 s
Society resolved to take the initiative. In the last week of
September, Soto announced plans to commemorate the martyrdom of
Francis co Ferrer, the famed Spanish anarchist who had been execut-
ed on October 11, 1909 during the semana tragica of Barcelona.
The gesture was provocative . Diego Ritchie announced his inten-
tion to prevent the mass meeting planned by the Workingmen's
Society. A strategy session held by Soto was broken up by
Ritchie's police on October 1st. 5 A forty-eight hour protest
strike was declared, and Soto appealed to Judge Vinas to permit
peaceful assemblies of the union's membership. This Vinas granted,
but plans for the commemoration of Ferrer's death were shelved.
The Society's leaders directed their efforts instead to the
5 La Vanguardia . October 16, 1920. p. 5
organization of ranch workers in preparation for the opening
of the new shearing season in October.^
Hoping to forestall just such efforts, Ritchie proceeded to
harrass the union's membership. On October 18th, the police
surrounded the headquarters of the Workingmen's Society where a
meeting was taking place and arrested twenty persons. These
included Antonio Soto and Jose Maria Borrero, a political
associate of Vinas, who had taken up the cause of the workers. 7
Borrero, a Spaniard, was also serving as legal counsel in Rio
Gallegos for the largest commercial firm in Santa Cruz. This was
the Sociedad Anonima Importadora y Exportadora de la Patagonia,
owned by the Menendez interests who were also dominant in ranch-
8ing
.
Both Soto and Borrero, and nearly all those arrested were
non-Argent ines and as such were subject to deportation under the
Residence Law, which provided for the expuls ion of dangerous
foreigners. This prospect stirred such concern among the union
membership that on the nineteenth the warehouses , docks , hotels
and restaurants of Rio Gallegos were deserted by their employees.
Police Chief Ritchie, confident that he could subdue the
Workingmen's Society with its leadership behind bars, had chosen
the path of direct confrontation.
The arrests of the eighteenth aroused angry protest not only
from Rio Gallegos 1 largely foreign-born working population but
Bayer I s p • 79
•
TIbid . p. 90,
8 Ibid . p. 113.
10.
also from the press of the nation's capital. In a rare show of
unity, both the Conservative La Prensa and the Socialist La
Vanguardia denounced the arrests in Rio Gallegos as an abuse of
qpolice powers. La Vanguardia announced that the Workingmen 1 s
Society had wired Socialist deputies, asking them to take the
matter to the floor of Congress. 10 La Prensa published a tele-
gram signed by 239 residents of Rio Gallegos, including the
Spanish consul there, which protested what they termed a wave of
"police violence" which had continued since the arrests. The
group charged Ritchie and Correa with responsibility for the in-
discriminent beatings administered to innocent Spanish workers
by police and gangs of "armed Englishmen". They criticized
Ritchie for closing El antart i co , a newspaper owned by Diego
Meneses, a Spaniard who was friendly with Jose Maria Borrero. 11
Along with such unfavorable press reaction, Correa and
Ritchie faced the continued opposition of Judge Virias who ordered
the release of all the prisoners* With the support of Correa
,
Ritchie refused to obey. Not until October 29 after the Minister
of the Interior had directed Correa to comply with Vinas' order
did the last of those arrested leave j ail
.
Having achieved the release of the prisoners, the Working-
men's Society chose to broaden the conflict both with local
businesses and the territorial administration . On November 12
it presented to the Rio Gallegos branch of the Rural Society a
^La Prensa , October 26, 1920. p. 12. La Vanguardia . October
23, 1920. p. 1.
^La Vanguardi a . loc . cit
.
^La Prensa. loc. cit.
11.
list of demands calling for improvements in pay and working
conditions for those employed on the ranches.* The Rural
Society, a nationally affiliated organization of lives tockmen
,
served as the ranchers' bargaining agent. The union insisted
on acceptance of each one of its demands before a single member,
in the port of Rio Gallegos or on the ranches of southern Santa
Cruz, would return to work. Two of these demands were
particularly odious to the ranchers. These were the adoption
of a strict code governing the room and board provided ranch
workers and the recognition of the Workingmen's Society of Rio
Gallegos as the sole representative of rural laborers in the
adjacent hinterland. However, the demands for increased pay and
for several lesser points were accepted in the counter offer made
by the Rural Society to the union on November l6th.
The response of the strikers to the ranchers' proposal
demonstrated the importance of living conditions among their
grievances, but also their willingness to yield somewhat on the
question of achieving exclusive recognition for the Workingmen 1 s
Society. The Rural Society, in turn, refused to give ground on
the question of living conditions except for the Clark family and
13
a Spanish rancher named Benj amin Gomez . By the end of November
,
striking members of the Workingmen's Society were fanning out
from Rio Gallegos spreading the word to isolated ranches through-
out southern Santa Crus. Many of these ranches, just beginning
the active season when sheep drives and shearing took place, were
*For the complete text see appendix V
* 2Bayer I, pp. ll8-9»
13La Vanguardia , December 11 , 1920 . p. 5
12.
paralyzed by the strike.
The speed with which the strike spread through the southern
part of the territory can be explained, in part, by the effective-
ness of the Workingmen f s Society. However, several factors made
the rural area particularly receptive to the idea of organizing
to strike: the long-standing grievances over living conditions
on the ranches; the painful effects of the recession that began
in 1919; and the displacement of small landholders by large ranch-
ing companies
.
As far as living conditions for rural workers were concerned,
one observer familiar with conditions on ranches in northern
Argentina frequently remarked on the high standards prevailing on
111
ranches in Santa Cruz. Jose Maria Borrero, who perhaps shared
the expectations of his fellow immigrants, found the quality of
li f e for peones deplorable. 1 ^ Another foreigner, a New Englander,
who spent most of his life working on ranches in Santa Cruz, felt
that conditions were about as good as could be expected in such
an isolated corner of the world. As far as he was concerned,
most of the workers turned their attention to living conditions
only when the recent period of rapid expansion had ended and
chances for upward mobility were limited. 1 ^ The highest paying
jobs on the ranches, those that conferred higher status, had been
in the construction of ranch buildings and fencing. After 1919,
^Lutz Witte, pp. U03-^08. Rodriguez, pp. 156-8. Correa
Falcon
, p . 30
.
***Jose Maria Borrero , La patagonia tragica . ( Buenos Aires ,
1957) pp. 20l*-212.
1
^Katherine and Robert Barrett, A Yankee in Patagonia .
(Cambridge, 1933) p. 282.
13.
there was very little of such work in Santa Cruz.
One specific grievance which united many of the rural
workers was the practice on certain ranches of paying wages in
foreign currency or on checks drawn on foreign hanks . Conversion
of the currency or cashing of foreign checks inevitably resulted
in discounts and service charges horn entirely by the individual
worker .
^
As for the effect of the recession on the average worker, we
need only recall the impact of the inflation suffered throughout
Argentina in these years combined with the widespread unemployment
experienced in Santa Cruz. A weekly publication of the British
community in Argentina described the current situation in Santa
Cruz in the following terms
:
A year or so ago, the far south territory of Santa
Cruz was enjoying a period of unprecedented
prosperity owing to the practically unlimited
demand at record high prices, created by the war,
for wool of all sorts. Now that wool, particularly
the coarser classes has become, for the time being,
a drug on the market, that s i tuat ion has changed to
one of distress. A recent telegram from the township
of Rio Chico says that as a consequence of the
depressed situation of the wool market, building and
fencing work are at a standstill. Local traders, as
well as the banks , have restricted credits. Transport
enterprises are in a critical state, owing to a lack
of merchandise to transport. 18
When faced with unemployment, the rural worker had to choose
between uninviting alternatives. He could remain in the hinter-
land and live by odd jobs or by his wits. He could join the long
line of those seeking some kind of job in the ports, where the
17 Lutz Witte, p. 395.
l8Review of the River Plate, December 10, 1920. p. 156l.
IV.
recession was also being felt. Or, he could emigrate and try
to make a start somewhere else. Jose Maria Borrero , in his
account of the strikes, claimed that the threat of unemployment
was the chief cause of unrest among working people in the terri-
tory in this period. 19 A British rancher interviewed by the
English language Buenos Aires Herald at the time of the outbreak
of the strike in late 1920, argued much the same point. 20
The displacement of the small landholder and the squatter
also contributed to the tense situation prevailing in the
interior. The actions of large ranching concerns on both sides
of the international boundary had, by 1920, given rise to a
vagrant population made up of those who had been ousted from lands
they had settled in some cases without the benefit of clear title.
Contemporary observers warned of the potential danger of this on-
21going process. In late 1920, the Socialist La Vanguardia
publicized one such case. An Argentine settler named Juan de Dios
Figueroa traveled to Buenos Aires in October 1920 on the pooled
funds of several small landholders such as himself who lived in
the northwestern corner of Santa Cruz. Figueroa had come to
present their case before the Ministry of the Interior. He claimed
that an Englishman named Gutt , who managed several large ranches
on both side of the border, had used violence to intimidate
settlers in the vicinity of Colonia Manuel Quintana into deserting
land provided them by the government. He sought the cooperation
of federal officials since repeated appeals to the territorial
^Borrero, pp. 63-69.
20Buenos Aires Herald . January 11, 1921. p. 7.
21Lutz Witte, pp. U03-8. Rodriguez, pp. 126-36.
15.
authorities had gone unheeded
.
22
It is not known what response
they got hut what seems clear is that displaced ranchers were
increasingly receptive to the idea of organizing to fight the
power of the large-scale enterprises.
Motivated by all these reasons
, workers readily joined the
ranks of the strikers. As they abandoned the ranches, they took
horses and firearms, signing I.O.U.'s in the name of the Working-
men's Society. Fresh mutton was obtained by simply seizing
animals. Other supplies were gotten from ranches or from
boli cheros
, proprietors of small general stores, who sympathized
with the strikers in many cases. The strikers congregated near
Lake Argentina in the western part of the territory. Here, they
sought the protection of the hills and the proximity of the border.
Four men qui ckly emerged as leaders of what soon swelled into
a group of six hundred strikers. Two were Italian immigrants:
Jose Aicardi, nicknamed "68", which had been his prison serial
number while serving a sentence in the Ushuaia penal colony on
Tierra del Fuego, and Alfredo Font, known as "El Toscano" , who
also had had several brushes with the law. The other two were
Argentines: Bartolo Diaz and Florentine Cuello. The latter had
served a five year sentence in the prison in Rio Gal legos after
a barroom knifefight. These four were the men who would exert
control over the striking rural workers in the southern part of
the territory
.
While the rural strike was taking shape in the interior, a
round of negotiations began in the port of Rio Gallegos. This was
22La Vanguardia . October 31, 1920. p.
Bayer I, pp. 202-U.23
16.
brought about by the visit of Alejandro Menendez Behety and
Mauricio Braun, the two most influential leaders of commercial
and ranching enterprise in the territory. While on the one
hand threatening to introduce strike-breakers, Menendez Behety
and Braun encouraged the Rural Society to make another offer to
the Workingmen's Society that yielded slightly on the question
of union recognition. These tactics brought about a split within
the Workingmen's Society. The majority, lead by Antonio Soto,
decided to reject the new management proposal, convinced that the
imminent arrival of the new territorial governor would bring
greater concessions. In this hope they were encouraged by the
actions of Judge Vifias and the counsel of Jose Maria Borrero.
Thus, the strike in Rio Gallegos and adjacent areas of the
interior continued.
Events in Rio Gallegos were echoed by labor unrest elsewhere
in the territory. In Puerto Deseado
,
employees of the large
commercial houses walked off the job on November 13th in demand
of increased wages and a voice in the management of the concerns.
Maritime workers soon joined the commercial employees. Local
authorities reacted by banning all public meetings and arresting
the local secretary of the Federation of Maritime Workers, a
national organization. This brought about a strike by railwaymen
on the Deseado -Las Her as line on December 2nd. Six days later,
police arrested twenty persons associated with the various groups
Then on the sixteenth, a protest march by two hundred strikers
was fired upon by the police. Two of the strikers were killed
"ibid. pp. 135-7.
25La Prensa. November 30, 1920. p. 13.
17.
26and six seriously wounded.
To the south of Deseado, commercial employees and maritime
workers in San Julian and Puerto Santa Cruz joined their
compatriots in the other two ports by declaring strikes in early
December. In San Julian, the bombing of the home of a leading
businessman resulted in the arrest of thirty persons identified
with the striking unions.
In the region west of Rio Gallegos
,
meanwhile, the continua-
tion of the strike was bringing about a confrontation between the
territorial police and the ranch hands holed up near Lake
Argentine. On January 2nd, nine poli cemen who had been sent to
reconnoiter the area, stumbled into the encampment of Aicardi and
Fonte. In the melee that ensued, two police were killed, a third
gravely wounded while all were captured by the strikers. Diego
Ritchie, with another detachment of police, wandered into the
same location a few hours later. Ritchie managed to extricate
himself after a protracted gun battle which left one policeman
27 ^
and two strikers dead. As so on as Ritchie had returned to Rio
Gallegos , Correa wired news of these incidents to the Interior
Ministry, repeating his request for federal troops . He also
alerted the Chileans of the possibility that strikers would attempt
28
to cross the frontier.
Correa's messages were joined by those of ranchers and
merchants demanding federal protection for their property. Two
2 ^La Vanguardia . December 27, 1920. p. 5-
27 Bayer I, pp. 158-68.
28Buenos Aires Herald . January 20, 1921. p. 3. La Prensa.
January 20, 1921. p. 11.
18.
addition incidents lent credence to their appeals. On January
Uth, Aicardi and Fonte seized four ranchers as hostages, hoping
thus to force the others to reach a settlement with the
29strikers. In an unrelated incident, on the eighth, an arsonist
burned down a warehouse in Rio Gallegos owned by a German which
contained a valuable supply of gasoline. More repressive actions
by police against strikers and their sympathizers took place
after these two events.
^
At this time, President Yrigoyen finally yielded to the pleas
for deployment of federal troops. On the sixth, he ordered a
detachment of marines under Lieutenant Luis Malerba to depart for
Rio Gallegos aboard the tanker "Aristobulo del Valle". Four days
later, fifty members of the Tenth Cavalry Regiment departed under
the orders of Captain Laprida. The arrival of the marines and
the cavalry at Rio Gallegos on the fourteenth and fifteenth,
respectively, enabled Correa to enforce martial law in the port,
but the strikers in the interior operated freely.
During the second week in January, as the troops departed
for the south, both the British and Belgian consular officials in
Buenos Aires urged the government to adopt strong measures in
dealing with the strikers and in protecting the lives and property
of their countrymen . The rumor circulated in Buenos Aires that a
British destroyer, the H.M.S. Petersfield, was at that moment
steaming from Montevideo to Rio Gallegos. On January 12th, the
British minister in Montevideo, Sir Claud Mallet, quashed the story
29 La Prensa . January 7, 1921. p. 11.
3 °Review of the River Plate. January lU, 1921. p. 85. Buenos
Aires Herald . January 20, 1921. p. 3. La Prensa . January 20,
1921. p. 11. Bayer 1, p. 177.
19.
stating that "the British government could be confident that the
Argentine authorities would guarantee by their own means, and in
the amplest manner possible, the lives and interests of British
subjects." Mallet affirmed that "the British government would
never take an attitude such as that attributed to it, and which
could be qualified as discourteous to the Argentine government."
Such disclaimers only served to draw further attention to the
British attitude over the situation in Santa Cruz.
Domestic political opinion was sharply divided on Yrigoyen's
handling of the situation. Both the Socialist and Conservative
press were critic al of the President for different reasons. The
Socialists saw the President's actions as clearly favoring the
ranchers while the Conservative press lashed out at the President
32for the months of indecision which showed favor to the unions.
Both of these opposition groups, however, were united in blaming
the trouble in Santa Cruz on Yrigoyen's decision to end its
33privileged trading status. In late December, officials of the
syndicalist F.O.R.A. IX (Federacion Obrera Regional Argentina of
the Ninth Congress) demanded that the government declare its
neutrality in the conflict between Santa Cruz 1 ranchers and their
employees. 31^ The Anglo-Argentine Buenos Aires Herald , reflecting
the cautious approach adopted by the British, urged conciliation
and warned against further polarization of Santa Cruz' sharply
31Review of the River Plate . January lh , 1921. p. 85.
32La Vanguardia . February U, 1921. p. 2. La Prensa . January
lU, 1921. p. 6.
33La Vanguardia . loc. cit. La Prensa . loc. cit.
3 **La Vanguardia . December 27,1920. p. 5.
20.
divided population. 35
However, Yrigoyen's political enemies saw no reason to
limit their criticism of the President's handling of the affair.
For instance, on January 20th, Matfas Sanchez Sorondo, a leading
Conservative deputy, took such criticism to the floor of Congress.
He likened the situation prevailing in Santa Cruz to that in
other frontier areas prior to the Conquest of the Desert, the
military campaign in 1879-80 that put an end to periodic Indian
raids. Painting a lurid picture of Santa Cruz 1 "descent into
barbarism", Sanchez Sorondo blamed Yrigoyen for failing to act
when requested to do so by the territorial authorities. 3 ^
The clamor for forceful action by the federal government was
echoed outside the halls of Congress. Alejandro Menendez Behety
led the outcry of ranching and commercial interests of Santa Cruz
37against what they felt to be inadequate government measures
.
Yrigoyen's stilled these critics by taking a series of dramatic
steps in the final days of January. On the twenty -first, newly
appointed governor of Santa Cruz, Angel Yza, and several sub-
ordinates departed for the territory amid much publicity. On the
same day, twenty marines were placed aboard the Sant a-Cruz-bound
?8
transport "Rio Negro" . On the tw en ty- s event h , the President
announced the imminent departure cf the remaining members of the
Tenth Cavalry Regiment under Lieut. Colonel Hector Benigno Varela
^Buenos Aires Herald . January 8, 1921. p. 6.
Congreso de la Nacion. Camara de Diputados. Diario de
sesiones . 1920 VI, p. 2k.
3TBuenos Aires Herald . January 25, 1921. p. 8. Review of the
River Plate . January 28, 1921. p. 21?.
38La Prensa . January 19 » 1921. p. 12.
21.
They were supported by a machinegun section of the Second Cavalry
Regiment. Taking advantage of the turmoil over Santa Cruz,
Yrigoyen announced simultaneously that he would resubmit a bill
to create special territorial gendarmes which Congress had repeat-
39
edly voted down in the past.
At this juncture, the Federation of Maritime Workers, who
had ties to the President, suddenly announced their decision to
lift their boycott of private shipping to the four ports of Santa
Cruz which had been in effect for over a month. The President's
actions, along with that of the Maritime Workers, created the im-
pression that no effort would be spared to bring about a speedy
,
r
conclusion to the trouble in Santa Cruz.
In the territory, itself, meanwhile, Correa's tough posture
had been bringing results. On January 21st, the day his replace-
ment departed from Buenos Aires, commercial employees and
stevedores returned to their jobs, ending a two month strike.
This decision signaled the near collapse of the Workingmen's
Society, but Antonio Soto, its Secretary, refused to abandon his
rural compatriots.
Just as the hard-line policy adopted by Correa and Ritchie
seemed to be having its desired effect, Governor Yza arrived in
Rio Gallegos on January 29th with the announced intention of
seeking a negotiated settlement. Once he had assumed control of
the territorial administration, Yza set about to achieve his goal
On February Uth, the Rural Society agreed to Yza's offer to
arbitrate their differences with the ranch workers. As a sign of
39 La Enoca . January 27, 1921. p. 1. La Prensa.
January 29,
1921. p. 6.
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good will to the union, Yza freed two hundred or so prisoners
in the territory who had been held by his predecessor due to
their activities in the strike in and around Rio Gallegos. This
action so shocked the members of the Rural Society that on
February 11th, they renounced their earlier acceptance of the
new Governor's bid to negotiate a settlement. The president of
the Rural Society addressed a telegram to the Minister of the
Interior complaining about Yza's decision to end the strike with-
out retribution for the violence and damage perpetrated by the
strikers. He urged the government to allow the armed forces to
"perform their duty" . ®
However, the cavalry forces which arrived on February 2nd,
were under Yza's orders and were used primarily to patrol in and
around Rio Gallegos. Lieut. Col. Varela, meanwhile, participated
with Governor Yza in the negotiations aimed at a peaceful end to
the rural strike. A tentative agreement was reached on the
fourteenth by which those strikers who surrendered with their
weapons and any stolen property would be allowed to return to
work unmolested. Work was to commence immediately on ranches
where the union's demands had been met, and the Governor promised
to intervene to gain acceptance of the workers 1 demands on the
rest. Yza simply overlooked the dissatisfaction already voiced
by the Rural Society. On the sixteenth, approximately four hundred
strikers led by Cuello and Diaz rode onto the "El Tero" ranch and
surrendered their arms to Varela. Aicardi and Fonte and upwards of
two hundred others refused to give up and dispersed, hoping to
Uo
La Prensa. February 12, 1921. p. 11.
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elude capture.^
Although Yza had succeeded in bringing the rural strike to
a speedy close, considerable numbers of both strikers and ranchers
resisted the terms which amounted to a dictated settlement. Eager
to salvage something from the season, some ranchers gave grumbling
as sent to these terms . The general feeling among the ranchers was,
however, that the "agreement" was a sell-out to the Workingmen's
Society
.
The surrender of four hundred strikers was taken by the
government to signify the end of the unrest in Santa Cruz. This
optimistic outlook was largely due to the way in which Governor Yza
reported the events to the Interior Ministry. In a telegram on
February 17th , he termed the surrender of the strikers "uncondi-
tional" which it clearly was not. He also promised speedy prosecu-
tion of all those responsible for criminal actions , a statement
that amounted to wishful thinking. The Radical newspaper La Epoca
proclaimed
:
The rebelling workers have yielded before the determina-
tion of the national authorities and order has been
restored. The Governor will now proceed with the task ^
of pacification through energetic and reasoned actions.
However, La Van^uardia 1 s characterization of the settlement as a
"complete victory" for the strikers was closer to the truth.
Bayer I, pp. 21U-7- La Vanguardia . March 15, 1921. p. 5-
March 19, 1921. p. 5. March 20, 1921. p. 5. March 21. 1921. p. 6
Col. Fued. G. Nellar, "Clari f i cacion sobre la campana realizada
por el Regimento 10 de Caballeria, afios 1921 y 1922, en base de
fuente oficial documental," Revista de la Esc uela Superior de
Guerra.LIII (July-August 197*0 PP- 126-7.
** 2La Epoca . February 18, 1921. p. 3.
^La Vanguerdia . February 21, 1921. p. 5 .
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That the Administration was willing to accept Governor Yza's
version at face value was an indie at ion that the maj or concern of
the President had been the political impact of the news from Santa
Cruz. The fact that the labor problems of the territory appeared
to be resolved was of primary importance. Officials in Buenos
Aires had little way of knowing how tenuous was the imposed
settlement
.
CHAPTER III
THE FAILURE OF
CONCILIATION
If the Administration in Buenos Aires hoped to create the
impression that Santa Cruz' labor problems had been resolved, it
vas soon to realize the extent of its failure. Deep-seated con-
flict between capital and labor could not be resolved by fiat.
In San Julian and Puerto Deseado, strikes of commercial employees
and maritime workers were unaffected by the end of the strike in
the south, Railwaymen in Deseado were also still on strike.
Shortly after the settlement of the rural strike was achieved,
workers at Swift's meat-packing plant in Rio Gallegos walked off
the Job in a brief, frustrated attempt to alter the conditions of
their employment . The worsening economic conditions in the terri-
tory made the local capitalists little inclined to make concessions*
The strikes in Puerto Deseado and San Julian which had begun
in late November 1920 became increasingly bitter with the passing
months. Not even the decision by the Federation of Maritime
Workers to restore private shipping service to the ports of Santa
Cruz budged the determined unionists. Employers had recruited
non-union labor and had blacklisted the strikers. The situation
vas particularly acute due to the threat of violence between
26.
strikers and strike-breakers
.
In early March, Governor Yza personally traveled to San
Julian and Puerto Deseado to request that the commercial houses
readmit the strikers and agree to some of their demands . In
addition, Yza secured the release of thirty-four prisoners held
1
in Puerto Deseado since December 10th. The leading merchants
,
including the Menendez Behety firm, Watson y Gordoniz Compan £a
and Compania Argentina del Sud, refused to accept the demand for
consult at ion with shop stewards over company policy, F.O.R.A.
IX 1 s delegate in Santa Cruz, Santiago Lazaro
,
reported that
merchants in both ports refused to sell food to the families of
2the striking men. However , after cons ider able effort by the
3Governor, the strike in San Julian ended on April 1st.
In Puerto Deseado, however, the efforts of Governor Yza were
to no avail, nor were the intervention of F.O.R.A. IX and the Mari-
time Workers. In mid-April, a delegation representing the strikers
traveled to Buenos Aires to dramatize their case. They made a re-
port to F.O.R.A. IX's Federal Council and appeared in front of the
Buenos Aires headquarters of the trading companies against whom
they were battling. Not until May did the strike in Puerto Deseado
come to an end. In both San Julian and Deseado, the strikers had
been readmitted but the merchants had avoided making any tangible
concessions
.
In Rio Gallegos, a strike at the Swift plant began on March
^a Vanguardia . March IT* 1921, p. 5.
2 Ibid . April 1, 1921, p. 3.
3 Ibid. April 2, 1921, p. 6. April 2U, 1921, p. 5. Bayer II,
pp. 17-18.
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25th. The participants were seasonal workers recruited in
Buenos Aires and transported over a thousand miles to work in
the Rio Gallegos plant or Swift's other plant in the territory,
located at San Julian. Working conditions in these plants were
not markedly different from those prevailing in any such place
at the time. Long hours were spent on one's feet in damp
,
freezing, gore-spattered lockers. The situation in Swift's
Santa Cruz plants was made worse by the contractual terms under
which the seasonal labor was brought to the territory. The
J anuary-to-May contracts signed by each laborer left much
discretionary power in the hands of Swift management. The
employee was promi sed a wage of s ixty-f i ve cents an hour for "all
the work he wants" which frequently amounted to more than any man
could withstand. The ship passage plus a thirty peso "deposit"
were subtracted from the first month's pay. The local manager re-
served the right to discharge any worker who contributed to a work
stoppage. If fired, the worker forfeited his return passage. The
housing and rations supplied by Swift were described by one worker
as inhuman.**
Workers at the Rio Gallegos plant were organized by the Work-
ingmen's Society which drew up a list of demands that included:
a maximum required working day of eight hours, required rest
periods for those working in the refrigerated chambers, and free-
dom to elect repressntatives to take grievances over food and
housing before management.^ Some violence attended the walk-out
on March 25th, but within a week the men were back at work without
**Borrero, pp. 219-238. La Vanguardia . June 26, 1921, p. 1.
^Bayer II, p. 31.
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having von a single concession from Swift.
The failure by the employees of the Rio Gal legos plant to
win any improvements in their s ituat ion was a reflection of the
immense power wielded by the meat-packing firms in the territory.
After all, with wool exports at their nadir, the only industry
that the ranching interests could rely on was the exportation of
meat. Faced with the threat of a strike in Santa Cruz 1 only
healthy industry, Governor Yza once again intervened but without
the salutary effects expected by the workers. Yza was able to
drive a wedge between the workers at the Swift plant and the
Workingmen's Society by promising to win Swift's acceptance of
their demands should the workers return to their jobs immediately.
Yza's promise was not kept.^
The failure of the Swift strike was not the only setback
suffered by the Workingmen's Society. After the general strike
had ended, the union remained sharply divided between those who
had broken with F.O.R.A. IX for its "lack of solidarity" and those
7
who wished to retain ties with the central labor organization.
For its part, F.O.R.A. IX's delegate in Rio Gallegos worked to
oust Antonio Soto as secretary of the Workingmen's Society because
of the latter's ant i -F . 0 . R . A . views. Soto managed to rally the
majority of the membership behind him, but the victory was a
pyrrhic one for printers, drivers, and mechanics formed separate
unions in defiance of Soto.
8
The alienation of certain trades from the Workingmen's
6 Ibid.
,
p. 33.
TLa Vanguardia . February 27 , 1921. p. 2.
8Bayer II, pp. 3^-39-
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Society in Rio Gallegos encouraged Soto and his supporters to
reemphas ize the org an iz at ion of rural workers who were as yet
not unionized. The dead season from June to September brought
many of the ranch workers to the coast where they were available
for proselyt i zat ion by the Workingmen 1 s Soci ety
•
Local ranchers became uneasy when confronted with the
prospect of renewed union activity among rural workers. Several
decided to express their concern to officials in Buenos Aires
,
hoping to impress upon the Administration the precarious economic
situation of the territory and the "subversive" nature of the
Workingmen 1 s Society. Forty ranchers were in Buenos Aires in
July to press for the creation of permanent cavalry units for
Santa Cruz and other national territories. They succeeded in
having a bill submitted to Congress on July lUth which would have
9
accompli shed exactly that.
On August l6th, the group broadened its scope by including
merchants and shippers in their campaign to ensure the security
of entreprises in Santa Cruz and to provide for the introduction
of non-union labor. 10 On September 12th, Yrigoyen met with a
delegation of this group. He told them that their concern for the
protection of their property was "natural", and he promised to
reiterate to Congress his desire for territorial police. He urged
them to lobby among Congressmen in order to aid in the passage of
the President's bill. La Epoca reported that the delegation left
the meeting "highly satisfied" by their discussion with the
9Congreso de la Nacion. Camara de Diputados. Diario de
sesiones. 1921, v. Ill, pp. 38-9-
10La Prensa. August IT, 1921, p. 11.
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President.^ The following day Yrigoyen sent a message to
Congress reminding the members that a bill to create a special
civilian police force for the territories had been pending for
several months. He pointed to the special urgency of the situa-
tion in Santa Cruz whose leading residents had made repeated
12
requests for such forces.
Congress refused to act on either Yrigoyen's proposal or that
submitted in mid-July by a group seeking regular cavalry units for
Santa Cruz. In parti al response to the pleas of ranchers, the
President despatched a cutter with a detachment of marines to
serve off Santa Cruz . However , engine problems forced the mission
r
to be cancelled. Santa Cruz' ranchers had won a measure of support
from Yrigoyen, but had failed to achieve their specific goal of
having federal forces stationed in the territory "before the new
season began.
The local entrepreneurs in Santa Cruz did not limit their
efforts to pressuring federal authorities. In July, they formed
a brigade of the Argentine Patriotic League. Brigades were also
established in Puerto Deseado and Puerto Santa Cruz at the time,
while San Julian's brigade dated from the previous December.
Alongside the Rural Society, the League would serve as defender
of local business interests and as the focus of anti-union
activity
.
A national organization, the League had been born of the
"Tragic Week" of January 1919 when its members participated in
13"La Epoca . September 13, 1921, p. 1.
12Congreso de la Naci6n. Camara de Diputados . Diario_de
sesiones . 1921, v. Ill, p. 568.
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violence against supposed anarchists and many innocent Jews in
the City of Buenos Aires. 13 It drew support from a variety of
respectable groups, including Conservative and Radical
politicians. Unlike adhoc vigilante groups recruited from the
upper class that had arisen in. the past, the League took firm
root in the polarized social milieu of the period just after
World War I. The transformation of the League into a truly
national body was the work of its president, Manuel Carles.
Carles had served as a national deputy from 190U to 1912, allied
with conservative groupings. Yet, in 1918 the Radical Administra-
tion named him federal interventor in the province of Salta.
Under Carles' direction, the League evolved into an influential
pressure group espousing an ideology of nativism and unrestricted
private enterprise.
The League denied the existence of social classes, arguing
that the only distinction between Argentines was their willingness
to work. This stand was designed to attract the immigrant or first
generation Argentine who had achieved a measure of material success."1
League members declared war on anarchists and sindicalists who in
their view would only obstruct Argentine development.^^
The League's success in establishing itself in Santa Cruz
was due not so much to the ideology it espoused, however, as to
^Carlos Ibarguren, La historia que he vivido . (Buenos Aires,
1969) pp. 223-5. Nicolas Babini, Enero de 191^ . (Buenos Aires,
1956).
1Vlanuel Carles, "Definicion de la Liga Patriotica Argentina,"
(Buenos Aires, 1920) pp. 5-23-
15Manuel Carles, "Declaracion de principios, organizacion y
propositos de los Soviets argent inos , " (Buenos Aires, 1920) pp.
»»-7.
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its willingness to act upon that ideology. The president of the
Rio Gallegos brigade, Ibon Noya, announced that the newly-formed
body would devote itself to bringing non-union laborers to the
territory. With cooperation from Buenos Aires, the League began
to recruit workers in late July.
Thus
, the confront at i on between contending social groups in
Santa Cruz showed no sign of lessening as the new season of ranch
operations neared. Each side was convinced that the future well-
being of the territory rested with the advancement of its own
interests. Each side, composed primarily of foreigners, attempted
to present its cause as an expression of Argentine nationalism
while denouncing that of its foe as a "foreign" and "subversive"
conspiracy
.
CHAPTER IV
THE SECOND STRIKE
During the dead season from June to September 1921, when
economic activity on the ranches of Santa Cruz was at a stand-
still, the leadership of both the ranchers and the Workingmen's
Society attempted to strengthen its position. The Workingmen's
Society did so by organizing among rural workers temporarily
lodged in the ports during the winter months. Ranchers and other
businessmen presented their views to the highest federal
authorities, in hopes of winning guarantees of protection against
the threat of continued labor agitation, and began recruiting non-
union labor.
In late September, when activity on the ranches resumed,
seasonal workers returning to the ranches found fewer jobs than
in the previous season. The slack demand for wool was one cause;
the introduction of non-union laborers was another. The ranchers,
moreover, were offering conditions that fell below the agreement
of the previous February, and many workers lacking an alternative,
accepted them. In response, the leaders of the Workingmen's
Society threatened to strike any and all ranches that failed to
abide by the agreement. By mid-October, the Menendez Behety
properties were struck as well as the Douglas' "Rincon de los
Morros"
,
reputed to be the largest single sheep ranch in Santa
3U.
Cruz •
Although the stoppage was not yet general, police in Rio
Gallegos responded to these scattered strikes by setting up a
dragnet and arresting several persons identified with the Working-
men's Society. Those caught were shipped immediately to Buenos
Aires, where, to their surprise, they were set free. Antonio
Soto, himself, managed to elude capture and fled to the interior.
On October 2Uth, the Workingmen's Society announced a general
strike in southern Santa Cruz. Their demands included the release
of all those arrested for labor union activity and the acceptance
of the February agreement . Within a few days, strikes began in
and around the other three ports of the territory, where organiz-
ing activities had gone on during the preceding months.
In Puerto Santa Cruz and its environs, Ramon Otorello, a
Spaniard who had worked as a hotel waiter before working on various
ranches, came to exercize leadership. Albino Arguelles , a Chilean,
was chief in the San Julian area. He had been employed as a ranch
hand for several years in that region. An Argentine from the
province of Entre Rxos , Jose Font, was the major figure in the
Deseado district. He was a teamster, who had hauled for local
ranchers for many years. Soto was the most influential leader in
the south.
^
Although these men had none of the previous criminal records
of such figures as "68" or "El Toscano" » they resorted to tactics
similar to those employed by the leaders of the previous strike.
The reason lay in certain characteristics of the territory which
10svaldo Bayer makes an effort to distinguish among these
leaders. Los vengadores de la patagonia rebelde. v. II and
III.
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presented unavoidable logistical problems. The most important
of these was the fact that few centers of population existed
out s ide of the ranches and the port towns . The former were
easily overcome by a large number of strikers but the latter were
well defended by police. This forced the strikers to seek a
means of survival by looting or "requisitioning" supplies of
food
,
horses, and weapons. The seizing of hostages, it was hoped,
would serve as a safeguard and speed the negotiation of a settle-
ment .
Reaction to the outbreak of the second strike was vehemently
negative on the part of the ranchers. The Rural Society of Rio
Gal legos met on October 30th and formally rejected the strikers 1
demands , which were no more than those grudgingly acceded to in
February. The ranchers argued that their own straitened circum-
t
i
stances precluded acceptance of the Workingmen f s Society 1 s original
i
i
demands. Ib on Noya, local president of the Rural Society and of
the Patriotic League, wired President Yrigoyen asking him to send
a regiment of cavalry to restore order and to allow the entrance
i
2
of non-union labor.
In Buenos Aires, Alejandro Menendez Behety called on the
I
Interior Minister on October 30th and "presented all the informa-
tion in his possession" with regard to the situation in Santa
Cruz. He reported "attacks" of an unspecified nature on his own
"Bella Vista" property and those of several other ranchers in
southern Santa Cruz. Menendez Behety offered to supply the govern-
ment with trucks, automobiles, and mounts for cavalrymen in the
3
event forces were despatched to the troubled territory."
2La Prensa . November 1, 1921, p. 10.
3La Enoca. October 30, 1921, p. 1..
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This information was passed on to Yrigoyen who announced the
following morning that one hundred and seventy-five members of
the Tenth Cavalry Regiment under Lieut. Col. Varela would depart
on November 2nd for southern Santa Cruz. In so ordering, the
President turned to the very commander who had aided Governor Yza
in negotiating the February settlement so roundly criticized by
the ranchers. Nonetheless, the speed with which the President
acted was reassuring.
Seeking further to dispell any appearance of indecision,
Yrigoyen published an executive decree creating a territorial
police. In circumventing Congress, the President pointed to the
violence in Santa Cruz as justification for preemptive action. 1*
The National press' response to the events in Santa Cruz
indicated a readiness to see the worst. La Epoca
, indicating the
newly adopted hard line of the administration, labeled the strike
"incendiary and revolutionary in every sense" whose purpose was
"the destruction of the ranches, the spreading of terror among the
inhabitants, and the ruin of the livestock industry in the terri-
tory." The Buenos Aires Herald declared that the trouble in
Santa Cruz was the work of "crooks whose ranks are momentarily
augmented by unemployed es tanci
a
hands or striking laborers from
the towns. ^ Moreover, the Herald questioned the wisdom of sending
to Santa Cruz regular army forces unfamiliar with the terrain:
h
For text of decree see La Epoca , November 10, 1921, p. 1.
5 Ibid. October 30, 1921, p. 1.
^Buenos Aires Herald. November 2, 1921, p. 1.
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It would be better to organize a special force
of hard riders and good shots, provide them with
all the supplies and munitions they require, and
give them a carte blanche to bring in the outlaws,
dead or alive. 7
The tactics employed by the strikers certainly placed them
outside the law. Yet, the difficulty of sustaining such large
groups away from points of supply, a fact which helped to explain
the looting
, was virtually unknown outs ide the territory . Disturb-
ed by the stories emanating from Santa Cruz, the British Consul
General in Buenos Aires telegraphed several British subjects
residing there, asking for information as to the true state of
Q
affairs.
Chilean authorities in Magallanes , close to the scene of the
strife, labeled the strike "revolutionary 11 and blamed it on so-
ft
called Argentine "weakness". The United States Consul in Punta
Arenas, capital of Magallanes, reported to the embassy in Santiago
that Chile had placed fifty carabineros and one hundred infantry-
men on the border near Puerto Natales and that another seventy were
poised for action on Tierra del Fuego. Such measures, it was
hoped , would prevent the spread of the movement to Chilean terri-
tory
.
T Ibid . November 3, 1921, p. 6.
8Ibid.
^La Prensa . October 31, 1921, p. 9. Buenos Aires Herald .
November 1, 1921, p. 1.
10The consul's report is to be found in: Ambassador William
Collier to Secretary of State, November 22, 1921, in Department of
State Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Argentine.
National Archives Microcopy M -51*. Reel 22, 835 . 50U5/201 . Here-
after referred to as DSNA.
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Events in Santa Cruz, itself, confirmed the seriousness of
the situation. On November 5th, several members of the Schroeder
family which owned the "Bremen" ranch near El Cifre in southern
Santa Cruz fired upon a band of strikers approaching their
property presumably to seize supplies, horses, or weapons. Two
of the strikers were killed, another gravely wounded. 11 Not all
of the ranchers were as determined as the Schroeders , however.
Most abandoned their properties in the face of threats of violence.
Five days after the "Bremen" incident, Lieut. Col. Varela,
six other officers, and seventy-five enlisted men landed near Rio
Gallegos. Varela was briefed by the acting governor Cefaly
Pandolf i , since Governor Yza was on leave in Buenos Aires.
Wasting no time, Varela gave orders to Captains Viflas Ibarra
and Campos on the eleventh to depart for the interior. Vifias
Ibarra, with fifty-one men was to reconnoiter the southernmost
part of the territory following a route through Tapi Aike , Fuentes
del Coy le to Punt a Alta and Cancha Carrera near the Chilean border.
Thirty-one men under Captain Campos were sent to patrol the
southern bank of the Santa Cruz river westward toward Lake
Argentine* Their orders were to pacify the countryside, using
whatever means available to restore normal activity on the ranches
in the area. They were to operate in consultation with local
police and property owners. Strikers were to be summarily arrest-
ed, and those found bearing arms were to be dealt with "militarily"*
X1Bayer II, pp. 132-5.
12Report of the Vifias Ibarra Squadron, MS in Papers of General (R
)
Elbio C. Anaya, p. 52. This is a collection of some three hundred
pages of material in xerox copy made available through the kindness
of Professor Roberto Etchepareborda . Hereafter referred to as Anaya
Papers .
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Varela, himself, along with another officer and twelve men set
out to patrol the area immediately surrounding the port of Rio
Gallegos. The remaining troops secured the port, itself.
Captain Vifias Ibarra's probe into the region of Fuentes del
Coyle and Punta Alta brought almost immediate contact with a large
concentration of strikers. Upon arriving at Fuentes del Coyle,
Vifias Ibarra learned that a group of strikers was camped two miles
outside of town. He promptly led his detachment to the area and
surprised eighty strikers. Contrary to the cavalry's expectation,
these strikers offered no resistance. They surrendered uncondi-
tionally after a few warning shots had been fired over their
13heads
.
After rounding up another f i fty or so strikers in the
vicinity of Fuentes del Coyle, Vifias Ibarra took forty men south-
ward along the range of foothills which extended the length of the
boundary with Chile, in search of a large group reported to be
camped at Punta Alta.
On the morning of November l6th, in dense fog, Vifias Ibarra
and his men stumbled upon this encampment . Vifias Ibarra later
reported that his squadron was fired upon by concealed gunmen.
One of the strikers claimed that these were warning shots fired
by sentinels.
11
* In either case, a brief exchange ensued which
resulted in several casualties among the strikers but none among
the troops. Vifias Ibarra put the total number of strikers killed
at five. 15 United States Consul Austin Brady, stationed nearby
13 Ibid. p. 53-
lUBayer II, p. 15 1*.
15Report of the Vifias Ibarra squadron. Anava Papers, p. 58.
in Punta Arenas, reported that as many as twenty were killed that
day at Punta Alta. 1 ** Osvaldo Bayer ? in his account of the
strikes, quoted an eyewitness of the encounter at Punta Alta who
claimed that several executions were carried out "by the soldiers
17Just after the Punta Alta incident. This charge remains un-
substantiated, yet so does the figure given by Vifias Ibarra.
Meanwhile, Lieut. Col. Varela returned to Rio Gallegos on the
eighteenth and subs e que ntly issued a proclamation aimed at bringing
about closer cooperation between his forces and the ranchers. Each
rancher was urged to: 1.) Inform the authorities of the identity
of any employee who joined the strike; 2.) Verify the destination
of any person crossing private property; 3.) Draw up a list of the
"nominal" staff of each ranch; U.) Forego any contact with the
union; and 5* ) Require that each employee register with the local
1
8
police. By these means, it was hoped that further actions by the
union would be curtailed and that those involved in the strike
might be isolated and then apprehended.
While Varela f s forces fanned out into the southern part of the
territory, strikers to the north threatened to seize the port of
Santa Cruz. Ramon Otorello and his fellow strikers in the vicinity
of the port had become convinced that success would depend on nego-
tiating from a position of strength. On November l6th, therefore,
Otorello led six hundred strikers and their sixty-five hostages
^Despatch from Consul Austin Brady, November 30, 1921. DSNA
reel 22, 835-50^5/203.
17Bayer II, pp. 150-170.
l8Hector B. Varela, "Relacion de la actuacion del Regimento en
los sucesos desarrollados en el territorio de Santa Cruz durante
el movimiento de caracter sedicioso," Anaya Papers, pp. 30-1.
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into the town of Paso Ibaflez, a few miles upriver from Puerto
Santa Cruz. Otorello's followers were drawn from a broad area of
the central interior of the territory, where they had taken
supplies and hostages. Upon their arrival at Paso IbaSez, the
group elected not to risk the capture of the port. Rather,
Otorello sent delegates to discuss terms with the ranchers who
had taken refuge there. The commander of the cruiser "Almirante
Brown" which was anchored in the bay, with a marine landing party
patrolling in the port, also entered into the exchanges. The
ranch workers demanded the following: 1.) Freedom for all those
arrested for union activity; 2.) Withdrawal of all non-union
labor; and 3.) Acceptance of the Workingmen 1 s Society's demands
19
of the previous year. The ranchers refused to discuss these
terms
,
choosing instead to wait for the arrival of Lieut. Col.
Varela and his cavalrymen.
When the news of the capture of Paso Ibanez reached Buenos
Aires, President Yrigoyen immedi ately took additional steps to
deal with the situation in Santa Cruz. On November l8th, he
announced the imminent departure of a mixed squadron of cavalry
drawn from the Tenth Regiment and part of the Second. These
forces were placed under the command of Captain Elbio Carlos
Anaya. Their destination although not specified was to be in the
northern part of the territory. Once there, Anaya was to come
under the general command of Lieut. Col. Varela.
Meanwhile, Varela had received a call for assistance from
the commander of the "Almirante Brown" in Puerto Santa Cruz. He
despatched First Lieutenant Schweizer and ten men to the port to
19 Ibid .
, p. 33.
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bolster spirits among the residents who feared an attack by the
strikers camped in Paso Ibaflez. Then after communicating with
Viflas Ibarra and Campos, Varela himself took five men and depart-
ed for Puerto Santa Cruz. With Anaya's squadron soon to land in
the north, Varela decided not to pull his limited forces out of
the south where they were quickly dominating the situation. 20
National press reaction to the deepening crisis in Santa
Cruz reflected partisan points of view. The Radical La Epoca
assured its readers that no extensive damage had actually been
done due to the effective intervention of the cavalry forces
.
These reports were based directly on communiques emanating from
21the War Ministry. La Prensa countered La Epoca by accusing the
government of covering up the true seriousness of the situation,
22
us ing telegrams from frantic ranchers and merchants as evidence.
Varela 1 s field reports contradicted these telegrams , and he him-
2 3self referred to them as "exaggerations bordering on hysteria."
The Anglo-Argentine Review of the River Plate reflected the con-
fused, part i s an coverage by printing both the desperate telegrams
2k
and Varela 1 s disclaimers. The Socialist La Vanguardia
,
openly
sympathetic to the strikers, pointedly asked why the so-called
"criminals 11 and "violent revolutionaries" had been so easily sub-
dued at Punta Alta without having caused a single casualty among
20
Ibid , p. 32.
21
La Epoca . November 25, 1921. p. 1.
22
La Prensa . November lU, 1921. p. 6. November 22, 1921. p.
12. November 29, 1921. p. 12.
23La Epoca . November 25, 1921. p. 7.
2
**Review of the River Plate. November 25 , 1921. p. 1381.
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the cavalry • ^
Notwithstanding the differences of interpretation as to what
actually was occurring, the news that the strikers were holding
sixty-f i ve foreign nationals as hostages at Paso Ibariez lent
credence to the more pessimistic accounts while at the same time
goading the diplomatic community into action. The United States
Charge d'Affaires made "strong representations to the Argentine
Government M when he learned that one of those held at Paso Ibanez
26
was the manager of the Armour meat-packing plant in Rio Chico.
British diplomatic agents in Buenos Aires likewise made entreaties
to the Argentine government and received assurances that all
27
necessary measures would be taken.
The six hundred strikers camped in the town of Paso Ibaflez,
meanwhile, continued to seek a negotiated settlement. After
Varela arrived on the scene, a delegate of the strikers sought him
out to discuss the possibility of an agreement. Varela, however,
demanded unconditional surrender within forty-eight hours. Should
the strikers fail to submit, he threatened them with the following
consequences: 1.) All those resisting arrest by the armed forces
would be considered "enemies of the nation"; 2.) Each striker
would be held responsible for any loss of life among the hostages;
3.) Any striker captured bearing arms against the armed forces
would be "punished severely"; U.) Any striker who fired upon any
member of the armed forces would be "shot on the spot"; and
2 ^ La Vanguardia . November 23, 1921- p. 1. November 27, 1921.
p . 1
.
26Buenos Aires Herald . November 23, 1921. p. 1. Review of the
River Plate. December 2, 1921. p. IUU9.
2
^Review of the River Plate, loc. cit.
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5.) Once hostilities began, only unconditional surrender by the
P 8
strikers could bring them to an end.
Considering that Varela had only a score of men at his dis-
posal, his demand for such a surrender was in reality a bold
bluff. Yet , he had calculated correctly , for the strikers showed
no willingness to engage in combat with the cavalry. During the
night of November 2Uth and 25th, the strikers abandoned Paso
Ibafiez, and leaving their hostages behind, began a trek to the
northwest. Varela 1 s ultimatum drastically altered the situation
in the central part of the territory, as regards both the tactics
employed by the strikers and the conditions of combat . The
cavalry had been ill-equipped to undertake the siege of Paso
Ibafiez in any event. Now, if there were to be fighting it would
take place on terrain and under circumstances that trained cavalry
knew best.
Varela's ultimatum also served to clarify his intentions with
regard to suppressing the strike. Contrary to the soothing
reports which he forwarded to Buenos Aires, Varela was preparing
to proceed as if the strikers were the forces of a foreign enemy.
The use of warlike rhetoric persisted throughout the Santa Cruz
"campaign" although official authorization of a state of internal
warfare had not taken place.
On November 26th, after consulting with Varela by radio as
to the best place for debarkation, Captain Anaya landed his
squadron of eighty men near San Julian. On the twenty-seventh,
they left San Julian under orders to cut the strikers' line of
retreat westward from Paso Ibafiez. With only fifteen men, Varela
28Varela, pp. 33-3 1*.
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started westward, also, hoping to overtake the slow-moving
group
.
En route
,
he and his men happened upon a contingent of
strikers retreating from the nearby town of Rio Chico. After
"a brief exchange of gunfire", the strikers surrendered. Varela
29reported six deaths in this encounter , but La Prensa later
estimated at least twelve deaths occurred during the exchange.
^
These included the group 1 s leaders.
Anaya, meanwhile, had decided to pass through Rio Chico
before heading westward. There he found the town deserted and
learned of Varela 1 s encounter. Apprised of the small number of
men at Varela 1 s command, Anaya despatched twenty-one members of
his squadron to join Varela's. Then, Anaya and the balance of his
squadron traveled an improved road toward Cafiadon Leon where they
hoped to meet the main body of the strikers. Varela reached the
vicinity of Cafiadon Leon on November 30th before Anaya and found
the strikers encamped on the "Bella Vista" ranch, owned by the
Menendez Behety interests. What followed thereafter has been
called a "battle" by some, yet one of the officers participating
31
in it estimated its length at less than five minutes. In short,
thirty-five cavalrymen led by three officers subdued four hundred
strikers in less than five minutes, leaving twelve of the latter
dead. The cavalry suffered no casualties. The strikers
1 leader,
Ramon Otorello, was among those listed as killed in the fray.
After these events at "Bella Vista", information regarding
29 Ibid . p. 35.
^°La Prensa . December 3 » 1921. P- 13.
31Lieut. Rafael A. Loza, "Memoria de la comisi6n desempefiada
desde Paso Rio Chico a Puesto Bella Vista," Anaya Papers, p. 50.
U6^ _
_
the nature of the group which had seized Paso Ibafiez came to
light. One of the freed hostages, a Spanish rancher, reported
that all internal decisions had been reached in "democratic
assemblies". He further stated that women and married men had
not been taken hostage by the group. Otorello, himself, he
described as "very strict" in prohibiting alcohol. 32
In sharp contrast, however, were the bitter comments of a
group of British ranchers and administrators who had also been
held at Paso Ibafiez. On December 2nd, they sent a letter and a
petition to British authorities with copies also mailed to the
Buenos Aires Herald in which they described at length the terrors
they had experienced. They called upon the British government
to "represent to the Argentine national authorities that British
subjects cannot thus be treated in civilized countries" and asked
for "the strictest possible guarantees for our lives and property
in the future and ample compensation for what we have already
1 33suffered." They reminded the authorities that the plight of
those British subjects still held "by the strikers was truly
precarious since "some of the revolutionaries who have fallen in
3U
the hands of the National Forces have been shot."
Approximately one hundred and f i fty miles to the southwest
,
meanwhile, Captain Pedro Vifias Ibarra, in command of the southern
zone, had reached the shores of Lake Argentine. On November 29th
his squadron came upon a group of strikers on the banks of a tri-
J La Prensa . December 19 > 1921. p. 1.
^Buenos Aires Herald . December 11 , 1921 . p . 1
.
3l
*Ibid.
butary, the Rio Perro. A gun battle ensued. Since the
Winchesters used by the strikers had far less effective range
than the cavalrymen 1 s Mausers , the outcome was foreordained.
The strikers finally retreated, leaving their dead and wounded.
Vifias Ibarra learned from prisoners taken at the Rio Perro
that the largest groups operating in s out hern Santa Cruz were
close at hand. One was camped on the far side of Lake Argentine
,
in the region lying between that lake and Lake Viedma . The other
contingent was located east of Lake Argentine, on the "La Anita",
another ranch owned by the Menendez Behety firm.
Vifias Ibarra decided first to knock out the group located on
the northern shore of the lake. To do this, however, he would have
to find a way to cross the Santa Cruz River, the effluent of Lake
Argentine which flowed eastward to the Atlantic. The strikers had
commandeered most of the river craft in the area, and only with
difficulty did Vifias Ibarra finally locate a few small boats in
which to make the crossing. On the morning of December 2nd, he
and twenty men crossed the river to reconnoiter the northern bank.
Within a few hours, they were approached by two delegates who told
him of the desire of the group camped to the north to surrender
unconditionally. Vifias Ibarra told them that his was only a patrol
for a very large number of troops in the area. He demanded that
they convey his request that all the strikers surrender at Puerto
Irma on the morning of the fifth. At the appointed time, one
hundred and eighty strikers appeared with their hostages and
stolen goods .
^
^Vifias Ibarra squadron, Anaya Papers , p. 6U.
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The group camped at "La Anita 11 , after learning of their
compatriots 1 surrender at Puerto Irma, debated their own future
course of action on the sixth . That day
,
Captain Campos j oined
forces with Vifias Ibarra, bringing thirty- three men and a con-
siderable amount of ammunition. While the strikers at "La Anita"
dallied over a decision, Vifias Ibarra placed his men in strategic
positions around the area. When delegates finally arrived to
discuss terms with Vifias Ibarra, he took them captive.
The subsequent engagement at "La Anita" resulted in at least
seven deaths among the strikers, according to Vifias Ibarra's own
36 37
count. The pro-rancher La Union put the figure at twenty-six.
Although the end had come for the Workingmen's Society in southern
Santa Cruz, Antonio Soto and others had managed to cross the
border in safety
.
News of the bloody encounters at "La Anita" and elsewhere
occasioned a storm of comment throughout the country. The pro-
rancher press in Santa Cruz was enthusiastic. El Pueblo of Puerto
Santa Cruz declared,
It is the general opinion that this sort of disturbance
will not be repeated due to the energetic campaign being
carried on by the troops under Colonel Varela, whose
firm purpose is to cleanse the territory of outlaws. 38
A group of ranchers in Rio Gallegos petitioned the Interior
39
Minister to name Varela governor of the territory.
36 Ibid. p. 69.
37Quoted in Bayer II, p. 258.
38E1 Pueblo . December 3, 1921. n. p. From a selection of
xeroxed news clippings provided by Lieut. Col. Jose Luis Picciuolo
of the Superior War College in Buenos Aires.
39 Ibid . December 3, 1921. n.p.
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In Buenos Aires, La Prensa also applauded Varela's apparent
success in dealing with the "violent elements" which had threatened
Uothe territory. On the other hand, the Socialist La Vanguardia
denounced the "battles" which had resulted in death and injury on
one side only. The Socialists charged Yrigoyen with aiding "inter-
national capitalism" by sending the army against "authentic Argen-
tines" who sought only a fair wage and slight improvements in their
hiliving conditions. F.O.R.A. IX, the sindicalist labor central,
which had disowned the Workingmen's Society, now wholeheartedly
embraced the cause of the rural workers in Santa Cruz. Like the
Socialists, the leaders of F.O.R.A. IX saw the conflict as one that
pitted a brutal, foreign capitalist class against a working class
U2
of Argentines.
The massing of strikers in the vicinity of both San Julian
and Puerto Deseado, areas which Varela's troops had not yet
reached, left Varela's task of suppressing the strike still un-
finished. Frantic messages arriving daily from northern Santa
Cruz blunted whatever criticism of Varela's tactics was heard.
The Review of the River Plate printed the following wire sent to
it by the manager of the Anglo-South American Bank Ltd. in San
Julian:
Whole San Julian district being sacked by armed
bandits. They have seized farms only seven miles
from port and have carried off all able bodied men
as prisoners including many British subjects.
**°
La Prensa . December 3, 1921. p. 13.
^La Vanguardia . December 6, 1921. p. 1. December 7, 1921
p . 6
.
** 2 Ibid. December 7, 1921. p. 6.
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Forces
,
seventy soldiers
, landed twenty-sixth
instant but it is feared will prove totally insuf-
ficient cope with situation. As measure precaution
in conjunction with Banco Nacional and commercial
houses have closed Bank to public for time being.
Entire situation intensely critical and most energetic
representation to authorities in yours absolutely
necessary . U3
Such reports created a sense of desperation which prevented a
calm assessment of the events.
Once having crushed the major concentrations of strikers in
the southern half of the territory, however, Varela was able to
respond to the pleas for help coming from the northern districts.
He directed Anaya and his squadron to patrol northward into the
San Julian district through the interior while Varela, himself,
prepared to lead another detachment along the coast. Anaya quickly
learned of the presence of a large contingent of strikers located
at Bajo del Tigre forty miles southwest of the port of San Julian.
As he and his men traveled toward Bajo del Tigre, they captured
many small bands of strikers who had escaped the engagement at
"Bella Vista". Anaya dealt harshly with individuals who allegedly
had sympathized with the strikers or aided them in some way. On
one ranch, for example, he arrested the foreman for having dressed
the wounds of one fugitive. Anaya was suspicious of all whose
interests diverged from those of the larger property holders.
These included small holders and, of course, the bolicheros whose
clientele was made up almost exclusively of ranch hands.
U3Review of the River Plate. December 2, 1921. p. 1^51.
Lieut. Elbio C. Anaya, "Informe de las operaciones realizadas
en el territorio de Santa Cruz por el Cuarto Escuadron del Regimento
10 de Cabaiieria," Anaya Papers , p. 8U. Also, "Diario", Anaya Papers
pp. 127-8, 1U3.
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The strikers at Bajo del Tigre, led by Albino Argiielles
,
were aware of Anaya's approach. Retreating before the cavalry's
slow advance, the strikers led a chase which ended on December
17th when Anaya overtook them at Tapera del Castelan. Anaya's
own report subsequent to this engagement is difficult to decipher.
The group apparently surrendered without a struggle, and Anaya
proceeded to "set apart" the leaders. Then, Anaya reported
rather cryptically that occasional shots were heard nearby, "giving
the impression that his troops were firing on fleeing strikers". 4 ''
Among those who were buried the following day were Argiielles and
U6Jara, the two leaders of the group.
The Review of the River Plate later estimated the total number
of deaths in this engagement at nineteen. Neither Anaya nor the
Review accounted for the casualties, but both sources affirmed the
importance of the surrender at Tapera del Castelan as signaling
the end of the strike in the area around San Julian. Only the
Deseado district further north remained to be pacified, and Lieut
.
Col. Varela was already preparing for a confrontation with the
strikers in that area.
Just as Varela was leaving Puerto Santa Cruz for Puerto
Deseado with twenty-five men, he received word that the territory's
lone railroad, the Deseado-Las Heras line, had been seized by the
strikers. Varela forwarded this news to Buenos Aires which the
government greeted with dismay. Due to the railroad f s proximity
* 5Anaya, "Diario", p. 133.
U6 Ibid. p. 13U.
** TReview of the River Plate. December 30 , 1921. p. 1709*
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to the oil fields around Comodoro Rivadavia, the government
despatched the "Hueve de Julio" and the "Belgrano", two navy
cruisers to the latter port. The "Almirante Brown", its obliga-
tion in Puerto Santa Cruz now completed, steamed northward to
LA
Puerto Deseado
.
Varela reached Puerto Deseado on December 17th, and the next
morning sent out armed trains along the railway line to find out
the strength and position of the strikers. On the twentieth,
Varela's squadron, reinforced by local police and volunteers, set
out for the town of Jaramillo where the strikers had reportedly
dug in. To their surprise, they found Jaramillo deserted, and
therefore continued their march westward until they came upon a
small group on a nearby ranch. According to Varela 1 s report, three
Uo
strikers died after a short exchange of fire.
Varela learned from prisoners that the main body of strikers
was located at Tehuelches
, a station along the railway line. On
their way to that town, Varela' s squadron was approached by five
automobiles containing strikers. According to Varela 1 s own account
,
the strikers immedi ately opened fire on the troops, who returned
it with equal speed. ^° When the melee ended, one of the cavalry-
men lay mortally wounded. Varela did not report the number of
strikers killed at Tehuelches. La Prensa put the figure at
fifteen. Varela only reported that the Argentine Jose Font and
another recognized leader named Leiva were among those who
** 8 Ibid . December 23, 1921. p. I6U5.
^Varela, p. 39.
50Ibid.
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died *^1 Basing his argument on a newspaperman 1 s account, Osvaldo
Bayer claimed that the deaths at Tehuelches actually occurred a
day after the encounter and were the result of summary executions. 52
The vagueness of Varela's own report lends credence to this
possibility. 53
Seventy miles south of Tehuelches, Captain Anaya was involved
in processing the prisoners taken at Tapera del Castelan and sort-
ing the looted merchandise. Each day he sent out patrols which
scoured the area for other concentrations of strikers. On the
twenty-fifth, a detachment under Sergeant Baigorria captured eight
strikers who claimed to be sentinels for a large encampment located
at Tres Cerros. Baigorria took seven of the men into custody and
sent the eighth to inform his compatriots of the cavalry 1 s approach
"The majority opted to surrender," Anaya reported later, but when
Anaya 1 s full s quadron arrived, a small group of the leaders alleged-
ly resisted. 5 This resistance was easily overcome , however
,
"by
a brief burst of fire." Anaya did not report the casualties, if
there were any , and neither did any other source . The 22 5
prisoners were sorted "according to the extent of their responsi-
bilities." Only forty-seven weapons were found among them; one
55for every five strikers.
With the surrenders at Tehuelches on the twenty-second and at
51 La Prensa . December 23, 1921. p. 9* Varela, p. Uo.
52Bayer II, pp. 232-236.
53Varela, p. 37.
5UAnaya, "Diario", p. lU2.
55 Ibid. p. 1U3.
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Tres Cerros on the twenty-fifth, the last large groups of strikers
in Santa Cruz had been broken up. Now it remained to the cavalry
to patrol the territory, ensuring a quick return to work, and
apprehending any small groups still at large. The bulk of the
prisoners were soon released into the custody of their employers,
but those thought to be "dangerous" were sent to the coastal towns
for questioning and trial.
Thus, the Santa Cruz strike ended with its violent suppression
by the armed forces. Ironically, Lieut. Col. Varela had shown
cool-headedness in his reports from the field. He had consistently
denied exaggerated accounts of arson, looting, and kidnapping. The
curious contrast between Varela's dispassionate assessments and the
tactics he employed in terminating the strike is apparent to the
careful observer.
Responsibility for the brutality with which the second strike
was suppressed has been diffi cult to establish. Varela, it seems
,
was impelled by a determination to win respect for the Argentine
military in the eyes of Argentina's neighbors and her own citizens
of all social classes. Shortly after the campaign ended, he
praised his men for "teaching the foreigner, who makes up almost
the entire population of the territory , what the Argentine soldier
is capable of, when a stranger wishes to disregard the Constitution
and raise another banner than the immortal and glorious insignia
of our nation • "^
Although Varela was inspired by such sentiments, it is un-
^Hector B. Varela, "Campafia de Santa Cruz, Resumen General,"
Anay a Papers . p. 6.
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likely that he acted without orders . The government made no
attempt to alter the course of the repressive campaign , even
when reports of casualties began to filter back to the capital.
It is very likely that Varela's general orders provided for
nearly all eventualities, leaving to the commander's discretion
the specific means of executing them. The harsh path chosen by
Varela reaffirmed the army 1 s role as an arbiter of social con-
flict under an administration willing to use its power in behalf
of influential economic interests.
CHAPTER V
THE AFTERMATH
The Radi c al admin i strati on of Hipolito Yri goyen
,
subject
to considerable national and international pressure, had turned
to the armed forces to end the labor violence in Santa Cruz,
Yrigoyen had resorted to a similar course of action in the past
when serious labor disturbances appeared beyond conciliatory
measures . The intervention of the armed forces had occurred at
the time of the railway strikes of 1917-18 and again during the
"Tragic Week" of January 1919, as well as during the dock strike
of mid 1921. These episodes demonstrated an official willingness
to employ maximum force when labor's drive for recognition and
"benefits threatened powerful economic interests or the public
order
.
In the case of the Santa Cruz strikes, the failure of the
government's efforts at conciliation had proven all too evident.
The differences separating the entrepreneurs and the labor move-
ment in Santa Cruz seemed irreconcilable. When Yrigoyen turned
to Lieut. Col. Varela to restore order in the territory, he un-
doubtedly contemplated a more repressive policy than that adopted
during the first Santa Cruz strike. While in all likelihood
the
President had not anticipated the brutality of the repression,
57-
such was within the scope of Varela's orders, at least as the
officer had interpreted them.
By supporting a policy of repression, Yrigoyen ran a number
of political risks. Unquestionably, he stood to alienate
organized labor, certain elements of which he had cultivated
since assuming office. On the other hand, the ranchers whom the
tough policy was designed to placate were in no way responsible
for its execution and were free to criticize the President at
will. Yrigoyen, however, was not without an escape route: If
he chose to, he could dissociate himself from the army's actions
by claiming that Varela had exceeded his orders.
Before the shooting in Santa Cruz had ended, the political
perils of Yrigoyen's policy had become realities. Both the
sindicalist F.O.R.A. IX, whose relationship to the administration
was of major concern to Yrigoyen, as well as the anarchist F.O.R.
A. V denounced the Tenth Cavalry's operations in Santa Cruz.
1
The Socialist Party , moreover , announced it would present a resolu-
tion in the Chamber of Deputies calling for an investigation of
the affair. Simultaneously, the conservative La Prensa criticiz-
ed Yrigoyen for not having solved the Santa Cruz question earlier
by stationing cavalry units there before the outbreak of the second
strike. 3 The Anglo-Argentine Review of the River Plate pointed to
"certain disquieting and indisputable facts" regarding the events
in Santa Cruz; it hinted that British interests felt no responsi-
XLa Vanguardia . December lh , 1921, p. 5. December 25, 1921,
p . 5 •
2 Ibid. December 23, 1921. p. 1.
3La Prensa. December 23, 1921, p. 5.
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bility for "possible miscalculations" on the part of the
administration
.
Meanwhile
, the Argentine Patriotic League vigorously entered
the controversy. In late December , Manuel Carles , the League 1 s
president, embarked on a "triumphal tour" of Patagonia. As the
steamer "Asturiano" called at various Pat agon i an ports, Carles
addressed groups of supporters and curious listeners. The tour
was planned to create the impression that the League had played
the key role in the pacific at ion of Santa Cruz. For his part
Yrigoyen was only too happy to allow Carles to accept responsibili-
ty for what had happened
.
Carles 1 tour was also aimed at gaining new converts at an
appropriate moment . In Puerto Madryn , Chubut , he vowed that each
hamlet and ranch in Patagonia would soon have "its own brigade
with its shield, flag, and arsenal." 5 In each of the four ports
of Santa Cruz, he urged his audiences to aid the League in making
Patagonia "truly Argentine" by working to establish Spanish-
language schools and by using the national tongue on the ranches
whenever possible. On every occasion, the League's leader praised
the actions of the armed forces in dealing with the strikers. On
his return trip to Buenos Aires, he had ample opportunity to learn
more about the campaign. As it happened, Varela booked passage on
the "Asturiano" for the return to Buenos Aires where he would make
his official report to the War Ministry.
While the Argentine Patriotic League praised the Tenth
^Review of the River Plate . December 23, 1921, p. 1711.
^La Prensa. January 1, 1922, p. 13.
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Cavalry for its actions, the administration had serious
reservations c When the tfAsturiano" docked in Buenos Aires on
January 27th, an enthusiastic crowd of League members greeted
Varela and Carles, but there vas no official welcoming party
present* This fact was not lost on Varela's critics.** The
commander proceeded directly to the War Ministry, brushing aside
the questions of newsmen*
Three days after Varela received this frosty official
reception, Socialist Deputy Antonio de Tomaso introduced a
resolution at the opening of the special legislative session
calling for the appointment of a five-man committee to investigate
7
the Santa Cruz affair. In addressing his colleagues, de Tomaso
singled out Varela as the principal figure in the brutal suppres-
sion of a lawful strike. The Socialist pointed to the contradic-
tion between the assessment of the situation made by Governor Yza
during the first strike and the cavalry 1 s act i ons during the
second. De Tomaso asked why Yza had remained absent from his post
throughout the course of the military campaign. Not without irony
did de Tomaso refuse to follow this line of questioning to its
conclusion, to the involvement of civilian decision-makers. In-
stead, he persisted in placing the blame solely on the shoulders
of Lieut. Col. Varela, declaring slyly:
I do not choose to believe that there is an Argentine
Minister let alone an Argentine President, who, upon
sending troops to the south to restore order, would
give the cruel and impious command to shoot down strik-
ing workers. 8
^La Vanguardia . January 28, 1922, p. 1.
TCongreso de la nacion. Camara de Diputados. Diario de
sesiones . 1921, V p. 5*.
Q
Ibid. pp. 61-62.
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The Socialist challenge was clear. The Radical majority in the
House of Deputies should explain Varela's actions, dissociate it-
self from Varela, or face up to the suspicion that Yrigoyen him-
self had given the order to shoot down the strikers.
When debate on the de Tomaso resolution began on February
8th, the Radicals were far from united as to their response to
the specific charges leveled by the Socialist deputy . Valentin
Vergara led off the discussion in behalf of the Radicals; he
charged de Tomaso with viciously smearing Varela. Vergara defend-
ed Varela and the men of the Tenth Regiment, pointing to the
threat of social revolution in Santa Cruz as justification for
any "excesses".' Leonidas Anastasi, a Radical deputy from the
Federal Capital, also conceded that excesses had occurred. But
instead of blaming Varela, he attacked the Argentine Patriotic
League for its undue influence in Santa Cruz.^ Francisco L.
Albarracin , himself a career officfer, denied that excesses had
taken place. He praised Varela for his decisiveness in forestall-
ing any possibility of Chilean intervention, which he maintained
had been a very real threat. 11 Despite their contrasting opinions,
the Radical speakers were united in opposing a congressional in-
vestigation. Each one carefully explained why justice would be
better served by leaving the issue in the hands of judicial
authorities
.
Conservative and Progressive Democratic members undoubtedly
9Ibid . pp. 89-90.
10 Ibid . pp. 96-99.
"ibid. pp. 105-109
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enjoyed the Radical's discomfort over the Santa Cruz question
but declined to speak on the Socialists 1 resolution vhich was
defeated along partisan lines. Forty-seven of the fifty-two
votes against the resolution were cast "by Radicals. The twenty-
eight deputies voting in favor included Socialists
,
Conservatives,
Progressive Democrats, and eight Radicals. Four of these eight
were members of the dissident Santa Fe Radicals. 12
Although the Chamber of Deputies accorded Varela this
measure of support , the administration kept the cont rovers i al
officer at arm's length. In a letter to the commander of the
Army 1 s Second Division, General Luis Dellepiane, Varela complained
that Yrigoyen had personally promised a presidential decree
vindicating the Tenth Cavalry Regiment, yet no decree was issued.
Putting Dellepiane on notice, Varela stated that, should the
President fail to keep his word, he personally was "disposed to
whatever sacrifice in order to save the honor and dignity of the
officers that served under my orders, and that of the very army
13itself , as I saved the nation 1 s honor in Patagonia. 11 Careful
to associate his own plight with that of the army, Varela hoped
that high ranking officers might prevail upon the President to
grant him vindication. However, efforts by Varela and Captains
Vifias Ibarra and Anaya to carry their fight through the chain of
command proved fruitless. To salve Varela's wounded pride, the
War Ministry announced his appointment to the post of Director of
12 Ibid. p. 110.
13Letter from Lieut. Col. Hector B. Varela to General Luis
Dellepiane, March 10, 1922. Anaya Papers, p. 182.
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the Cavalry School, a prestigious assignment, on March 16th. 11*
During the height of public consciousness over the Santa
Cruz affair, the Left made of Varela a symbol of repression
against the working class. The Administration's lack of clear
support for Varela abetted this process. Amidst the outcry, a
German anarchist, Kurt Wilkens
, decided that he must assassinate
Varela, and after months of planning and rehearsal, he finally
acted. On the morning of January 25, 1923 Wilkens threw a per-
cussion "bomb at Varela who had just emerged from his Buenos
Aires home. The blast wounded both Varela and Wilkens, who had
stood too close to his target in order to prevent an innocent
pedestrian from walking between them. Varela, lying on the side-
walk
,
attempted to draw his sabre at the moment Wilkens opened
fire with a revolver. When a crowd gathered, Wilkens immediately
surrendered. Varela was carried to a nearby pharmacy where he
15died within minutes
.
Wilkens 1 act provoked an angry outcry
,
particularly within
the administration of Yrigoyen's Radical successor, Marcelo T.
Alvear, as well as within the army and the Argentine Patriotic
League. A few hours after Varela's assassination became known,
President Alvear issued a decree declaring the Lt . Colonel ' s death
a direct consequence of the duties entrusted him by Yrigoyen.
1 ^
Alvear 's decree gave full vindication to Varela - and the army -
La Epoca.
La Prens a
PP • 1, 3.
La Epoca
.
lU
16
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while also providing a generous pension for his widow.
Funeral services held at the Circulo Militar became a means
of expressing outrage against the anarchists and also giving
Varela the public exoneration denied him while alive. The
Executive Branch was represented by President Alvear, Vice
President Elpidio Gonzalez, and War Minister Agustin P. Justo.
The Congress was represented by delegations from both houses.
Several members of the General Staff were present including
Inspector General Jose F. Uriburu. And General Pablo Riccheri
spoke for the Patriotic League. Former President Yrigoyen made a
17brief appearance to pay his respects.
At the graveside ceremonies at "La Chacarita" cemetary,
various speakers praised Varela and excoriated the anarchists.
Speaking for the Executive Branch, War Minister Justo expressed
his contempt for Wilkens and those foreigners "who do not
acknowledge the greatness of our ideals nor the uniqueness of our
people." On the issue of Santa Cruz, he maintained that Varela
1
8
had acted at all times within his orders. Lieut. Col. Julio
Costa representing the Circulo Militar, and Captain Eleazar Videla
the navy, echoed these sentiments. Atilio Larco of the Center for
Former Radical Revolutionaries eulogized Varela's participation in
19
the abortive revolution of 1905. General Ezequiel Pereira
commented briefly on behalf of fellow officers who were members of
the Patriotic League, and then introduced Manuel Carles. Carles
1TLa Prensa . January 27, 1923, p. 9.
l8Ibid . Also La Epoca . January 27, 1923, p.
19La Epoca . January 27, 1923, p.
6U.
criticized the recent abrogation of the death penalty and the
draconian Law of Social Defense. He declared that Varela f s
assassination was but a tragic result of his performance of
duty. La Prensa reported that Carles profoundly impressed those
20present. Captain Elbio C. An ay a concluded the program by
reviewing various incidents of the Santa Cruz campaign and
affirming that Varela had merely "obeyed orders received from his
21
superiors with exemplary discipline."
Anaya's assertion, along with the statements of Justo and
Alvear, to the effect that Varela had acted with Yrigoyen's orders
rekindled the controversy as to the exact nature of those orders.
La Vanguardia interpreted the Alvear administration's exculpation
of Varela as proof that Yrigoyen, himself, had been directly res-
22
ponsible for the bloody suppression of the second strike. The
Yrigoyenist La Epoca responding to the Socialist charge and a
similar one by the conservative La Razon , claimed that Varela'
s
orders before both the first and second strikes had been identical
"to quell the disturbances without extreme measures and blood-
shed if at all possible." 23 While insisting that the violent
suppression of the movement had resulted from the strikers'
refusal to lay down their arms, La Epoca also maintained that if
any of the charges against Varela were in fact true, "he must have
rashly disobeyed the instructions received from the government."
20La Prensa . January 27 , 1923, p. 9.
Ibid .
22La Vanguardia . January 28, 1923, p. 1
23La Epoca . January 26, 1923, p.
2U^Ibid.
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Within a few months of Varela's death, Santa Cruz once
again attracted national attention. Under bizarre circumstances,
Varela's assassin, Kurt Wilkens, was himself murdered in a prison
hospital. The assailant had served as a policeman in Santa Cruz
and had been held hostage at "El Cerrito" by Aicardi and Fonte
during the first strike.
If Varela's assassination had provoked an outcry on the
Right, Wilkens 1 death had a similar impact on the Left. The day
following his murder , sindicalist and anarchist labor centrals
announced a three day general strike. While protesting Wilkens 1
death which they blamed on the collusion of prison guards with
the murderer , leaders of national labor organizations were
apologetic for their relative inaction during the Santa Cruz
strikes. This note of unity inspired by the horror of the entire
Santa Cruz affair ended, as so often in the past, with the termina-
25
tion of the general strike.
^Sebastian Marotta, El movimiento sindical argentine . Ill
(Buenos Aires, 1973), pp. 101-103.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The Santa Cruz strikes, particularly the Yrigoyen govern-
ment's handling of them, have remained a compelling historical
question to the present day. This arises largely from their
crucial importance in any appraisal of Yrigoyen's relations with
organized labor and with the army. Both have proven controver-
sial aspects of Yrigoyen f s first presidency. The widely differ-
ing interpretations of his labor policy have frequently turned
on the approach to the Santa Cruz strikes, whether viewed as the
exception or the rule. In terms of Yrigoyen's relations with the
army , we are prompted to ask whether this incident may have had
bearing on the progressive alienation of many officers from
Yrigoyen. The rise of these two forces, the army and labor, and
their alienation from formal democratic rule, have been the most
significant trends in Argentine political life since the time of
Yrigoyen
.
The nature of Yrigoyen's labor policy has been clouded in
myth and partisan wrangling. Historians associated with
Radicalism have traditionally emphasized what his policy toward
the unions was not: It was not the unmitigated hostility of
earlier "oligarchic" governments- However, such writers have
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been hard pressed to describe the policy's positive attributes.
Gabriel del Mazo called Yrigoyen's stance one of official
"neutrality", permitting "the free play of labor organizations
in their struggle for improvements in living conditions." 1 This,
according to del Mazo, represented an "intense transformation"
of the previous relationship between capital, labor, and the
state. Except for the maritime workers' strike of November 19l6
and the strike against the Central Argentine Railway in August
191T» when Yrigcyen appeared to intervene in the workers 1 behalf
del Mazo has offered few concrete examples of this "intense trans-
formation." Incidents such as the "Tragic Week", when repressive
measures were freely employed, del Mazo dismissed as mere aberra-
tions • ^
Felix Luna, another Radical historian, likened Yrigoyen's
support of working class interests to the old-fashioned paternalism
of the estanciero . The Yrigoyen government, in Luna's view, provid-
ed a "synthesis of all social elements ," demonstrating that "with
mutual tolerance and good faith, there is no conflict which cannot be
resolved." 3 Luna explained the "Tragic Week" and the Santa Cruz
strikes as instances in which "Yrigoyen was forced to take
energetic measures to guarantee the tranquility of the population"
making use o? forces "over which the government had no possibility
of exercizing effective control
.
1Gabriel del Mazo, El Radicalismo . Vol. I (Buenos Aires, 1959)
p. 205.
2Ibid . p. 206.
3Felix Luna, Yrigoyen . (Buenos Aires, 195*0 p. 26l.
U Ibid. p. 251.
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Those historians closely associated with the labor move-
ment, itself, have interpreted Yrigoyen's labor policy from a
sharply different perspective. Sebastian Marott a , a leading
sindicalist and onetime secretary of F.O.R.A. IX has both praised
and vilified Yrigoyen's vaunted obrer i smo . His assessment of the
Santa Cruz affair was couched in bitter terms. As a man who dealt
directly with Yrigoyen on several occasions, however, he was more
willing than many of his comrades to accept the President's claims
of innocence
.
An anarchist such as Diego Abad de Santillan (and a neo-
anarchist such as Osvaldo Bayer) pictured Yrigoyen as the sworn
enemy of labor. ^ Except for some tenuous contact in Rosario,
Yrigoyen spurned the anarchists, and made them the targets of
scorn and repression. Bayer saw in the suppression of the Santa
Cruz strikes a vendetta against "anarcosindicalism' . Yet there
is little evidence that Soto and his associates pursued clearly
defined goals
.
Socialist writers depicted Yrigoyen's policy toward labor as
8
a program of manipulation, coercion, and outright oppression.
They saw the President's apparently pro-labor actions as ploys to
undermine the electoral support for their party. Seen from this
5Marotta, III, pp. U6-U9.
6Diego Abad de Santillan, La F.O.R.A. (Buenos Aires, 1933)
pp. 258-267.
TBayer, I. pp. U8-5 1*.
8The pages of La Vanguardia amply reflect this point of view.
See also Martin S. Casaretto, Historia del movimien to obrero
argentino (Buenos Aires, 19*6) 2 v. and Jacinto Oddone,
Gremiali^mo proletario arsentino (Buenos Aires, 19*9).
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perspective, Santa Cruz was but one manifestation of a uniformly-
hostile policy.
o in
Recent studies by Samuel F. Baily and David Rock, while
departing from these partisan analyses, have not provided a
comprehensive explanation of this complex policy question. Baily
has suggested that a chronological breakdown of labor policy during
Yrigoyen's first term reveals that 1919 was the turning point from
a more-or-less benevolent to a definitely hostile approach. 11 Rock
has accepted this general schema, but has applied his own study
of electoral politics in the Federal Capital to the question and
has reached some additional conclusions.
Rock has largely come to agree with the Socialists that Yri-
goyen's labor policy was a device for manipulating working class
voters, a weapon in his struggle for control of the Federal
Capital. 12 According to Rock, however, Yrigoyen was forced to
scrap this strategy after 1919, when he came under severe pressure
from British economic interests and certain elements of the
Argentine military. From Rock's vantage point, then, the suppres-
sion of the Santa Cruz strike was a sign of Yrigoyen's submission
to the desires of these groups.
As far as the military's participation in the Santa Cruz
affair, Yrigoyen did not pursue a course designed to please high-
ranking officers. During the first strike (1920) the forces under
9Samuel L. Baily, Labor, Nati onalism, and Politics in Argentina
(New Brunswick, 1967).
10David Rock, Politics in Argentina 1 890-1930. (Cambridge, 1975)
11Baily, pp. 3^-39.
12Rock, pp. 127-9.
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Varela were subordinated to the political appointees of the
administration
. In the second strike, Varela was thrust into
the forefront with the civilian officials absent or in the back-
ground. The result was that Varela and his men took the blame
for ridding Santa Cruz of labor agitation in a brutal campaign.
The seeming betrayal of Lt. Col. Varela was the sort of
politic al treachery that could not help but alienate the army 1 s
13leadership. This betrayal is all too evident from Varela 1 s own
words upon returning to Buenos Aires in January of 1922. His
expect at ions of the treatment to be accorded him and his men by
Yrigoyen were, plain:
*
The glorious mission which vas the lot of the Tenth
Cavalry, and part of the Second, should he considered
an example for our army - an actual case of warfare.
The National Government can and should consider it
such, authorizing the promotions to which these men
are entitled and which the patria owes them for ,
^
fighting in her behalf and in behalf of her flag.
In the absence of official, public recognition, it fell to the
Patriotic League to honor Varela and the members of his expedi-
tionary force, presenting them with campaign medals at a dinner
in May of 1922.
In his letter to General Dellepiane quoted earlier, Varela
equated maintenance of internal order with the national honor.
Such a viewpoint would hardly have seemed out of place to
Dellepiane, who himself served as commander of the military
13For a discussion of officer discontent over Yrigoyen's presi
dency see Robert A. Potash, The Army an d Politics in Argentina
1928-19^ . (Stanford, 1969) chapter I. Also Juan V. Orona, La
logja militar que enfrento a Hipol itc Yrigoyen. (Buenos Aires,
1965) .
lUHector B. Varela, "Resumen General", Anaya Papers, p. 7.
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occupation of Buenos Aires during the violence of January 1919
•
Varela, and those who have defended him subsequently, compared
the Santa Cruz campaign with Rosas 1 defense of Argentine
interests in the l830 f s or with the campaign led by Roca against
the marauding Indians in 1869-70. According to this version,
Varela had only acted to close a breach through which British or
Chilean adventurers might have entered. Those who criticized
Varela 1 s actions, have taken the view that Argentine independence
had long since been surrendered to European economic hegemony.
Defense of the existing order, then, was defense of the economic
subjection of the Patagonian workers - and of Argentina, itself.
In any case, the issue of Argentine nationalism had value to the
strikers and entrepreneurs only in its manipulative qualities, as
we have seen
.
The question of foreign press ures exerted on Yrigoyen is as
problematical as that of military pressures. While seeking
positive action by the national authorities, diplomatic opinion
was not united as to a specific course to be followed in dealing
with the Santa Cruz strikers. The Anglo-Argentine press staked
out no dogmatic position. Watchful after British interests in
Patagonia, editors were willing to consider both conciliatory and
violent tactics to reach an accord. No final verdict on the
British role is possible, however, without reference to the
diplomatic correspondence which was not available to this writer.
Certainly both military and diplomatic pressures weighed in
Yrigoyen's decision to shift from a conciliatory to a repressive
stance on Santa Cruz between 1920 and 1921. Most likely, Yrigoyen
made a deliberate rather than an accidental decision, as the
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absence of Yza from his post and the broad authority given
Varela indicate. In order to explain fully this shift, however,
another crucial factor must be considered. That factor is party
politics, particularly the struggle for control over the Radical
Party as it approached the presidential election of 1922.
Gabriel del Mazo , in his history of Radicalism, has traced
the split between "blues", presumably aristocratic ant i-Yri goy en
Radical leaders, and the "reds", Yrigoyenists of less prestigious
social credentials, to the first decade of the twentieth century.
Yet del Mazo also maintained that this division became
irreconcilable only after Yrigoyen became president. His
"social policies", said del Mazo, were the major cause of the
cleavage. The situation became particularly difficult during
1918 when the leadership of the Radical's party organization in
the Federal Capital publicly criticized the direction taken by
Yrigoyen. Among those who led this rebellion were Vicente Gallo
Arturo Goyeneche, Carlos Becu, Jose Tamborini , Victor Molina,
Luis and Santiago Rocca. They called for a return to "the tradi'
tional spirit" of Radicalism which del Mazo, himself, described
as "socially conservative."^
David Rock showed how, in late 1918, Yrigoyen assiduously
courted a prominent "blue", Leopoldo Melo , to serve as Interior
IT
Minister, the key position in internal security matters. A
few weeks after his refusal to join the cabinet, Melo and others
15 del Mazo, II, pp. 27-31
l6 Ibid.
,
pp. 31-35.
17Rock, pp. 175-6.
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with similar views banded together with non-Radi cals in founding
the Argent ine Patriotic League in order to combat "the soviet
threat"
. Manuel Carles
,
Yrigoyen 1 s former int erventor in Salt a
,
along with Admiral Domecq, a future Navy Minister under Alvear,
were among those who played central roles in the budding organiza-
tion. Subsequently , the Administration openly endorsed the
League ' s interpretation of the violence of January 1919 as a soviet
18
conspiracy
.
The disagreement within his own party over the labor question
caused Yrigoyen discomfort , and perhaps prevented him from con-
fronting the League even when at its most provocative . So free
was the League to pursue its ant i- lab or activities and so prominent
were Radicals within it that La Vanguardia was prompted to charge:
The League is a device dreamt up or taken advantage
of by Sr. Yrigoyen in order to play his two-faced 10
political game : the workingman 1 s , capitalist's friend.
This blunt analysis of Yrigoyen's relationship with the League
suggests an aspect of his presidency little studied heretofore.
Combined with other factors, then, the nature of Radicalism
itself appears at the very heart of this controversy. The decision
to make labor policy subservient to party unification may explain
not only the government's response to the Santa Cruz strike, but
the dispatch of federal troops to the Chaco to end the strike
against "La Forestal"
.
20
It may also help us understand the
18Ibid. p. 179.
19 La Vanguardia . May 29, 1921, p. 1.
20Gaston Gori , La Forestal . (Buenos Aires, 1965).
government's equivocal attitude toward a series of brazen,
armed attacks against labor groups carried out by the Patriotic
League throughout the year 1921. A closer look at the inner
workings of Radicalism from 1919 to 1921 may shed considerable
light on the repression of organ i zed labor in this period*
The nature of Yrigoyen's political movement, and its connec-
tion with the Patriotic League, have yet to receive sufficient
study and analysis. Once we have penetrated the surface of these
topics, we will be able to further refine our knowledge of labor
policy under Yrigoyen, including the case of the Santa Cruz
strikes
.
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APPENDIX I
THE POPULATION OF THE TERRITORY OF SANTA CRUZ IN 1913
Argentine-born Forei gn-born Tot al
male female total male female total male female total
Deseado 680 376 1056 178U U23 2207 2U6U 799 3263
San
Julian 206 lUo 3U6 658 199 857 86U 339 1203
Santa
Cruz
U80 323 803 1110 295 11*05 1590 618 2208
Coyle 86 77 163 22U 59 283 310 136 kk6
Rio
Gallegos 1*97 382 879
1386 563 19^9 1883 9^5 2828
Totals 19^9 1298 32U7 5162 1539 6701 7111 2837 99^8
Source: Comision Nacional del Censo Tercer Censo Nacional.
Vol. II (Buenos Aires, 1915) p. 108.
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APPENDIX II
ADULT MALE POPULATION OF THE TERRITORY OF SANTA CRUZ
BETWEEN THE AGES OF 15 AND 60 IN 1913
Argentine -born Foreign-born Total
15-20 1U5 3U7 U92
20-25 180 10U3 1223
25-30 198 ' 1157 1355
30-UO 299 1398 1697
U0-50 169 618 787
50-60 62 197 256
Totals 1053 1*760 5813
Source: Comision Nacional del Censo, Tercer Censo Nacional.
(Buenos Aires, 1915) pp. 285-290.
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APPENDIX III
DISTRIBUTION OF LANDED PROPERTIES IN THE TERRITORY OF SANTA CRUZ
IN THE YEAR 1913, BY SIZE OF HOLDING AND TOTAL INVESTMENT:
Hast a
$5,000 pesos
5001-10 ,000
10001-
50 ,000
50 ,001-
100 ,000
100 ,001 +
Total
1001-
5000 hect
79
9
10
DESEADO
5001-
10,000 h .
72
19
10
10 ,001-
25,000 h
16
17
2k
25,001+ h. Total
98 101 63
5
1
11
167
hi
hi
11
1
273
Hast a
$5,000 pesos
5001-10 ,000
10 ,001-
50 ,000
50 ,001-
100 ,000
100 ,001 +
Total
1001-
5000 hect
SAN JULIAN
5001-
10,000 h.
8
10 ,000-
25,000 h
10
39
25,001+ h. Total
15 51
1
3
6
12
15
50
1
3
81
Hasta
$5,000 pesos
5001-
10,000
1001-
^000 hect
6
k
SANTA CRUZ (DISTRICT)
5001- 10001- 25,000+ h
10 ,000 h . 25 ,000 h . .
7
8
13
lU
1
2
Total
27
28
78.
10 ,001-
50 ,000
50 ,001-
100 ,000
100 ,001 +
Total
1001-
5000 hect
5001-
10,000 h
8
16 2k
10 ,001-
25,000 h
U0
h
1
72
25 ,001+ h
8
6
3
20
Total
60
13
U
132
COYLE
1001-
5000 hect
Hast a
$5,000 pesos
5001-
10 ,000
10 ,001-
50 ,000
50 ,001-
100 ,000
100 ,001+
Total
5001-
10,000 h .
10 ,001-
25,000 h
1
7
25,001+ h
h
1
9
Total
11
k
2
18
RIO GALLEG0S
1001-
5000 hect
Hast a
$5,00 pesos
5001-
10 ,000
10 ,001-
50 ,000
50 ,001-
100 ,000
100 ,001+
Total
Source
:
5001-
10,000 h .
8
10,001-
25 ,000 h . 25 ,000 h . Total
12
2h
8
27
Comisi6n Nacional del Censo Tercer Censo
Nacional
(Buenos Aires, 1915) PP- 567-8.
29
17
8
6U
Vol.
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INDIVIDUALS ENGAGED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF RURAL PROPERTIES IN THE
TERRITORY OF SANTA CRUZ IN THE YEAR 1913 BY NATIONALITY:*
Deseado Julian
Owner Renter Empl
.
Total Owner Renter Empl
.
Total
Chilean 30 2 6 38 2 3 3 8
French 5 3 U 12 1 1 2 k
German 8 2 6 16 2 3 5
Spanish 56 5 25 86 2 5 7
British 2 2 5 9 3 lU 31
Total
28 19 57Foreign 107 Ik U7 168 10
Argent ine 56 9 17 82 3 18 1 22
Santa Cruz Coyle
Owner Renter Empl
.
Total Owner Renter Empl. Total
Chilean 3 1 k 8
French 6 7 8 21 1 1
German 3 5 8 1 1 2
Spanish 6 10 5 21 • k k
British 7 12 8 27 5 1 6
Total
Foreign 25 35 25 85 11 2 13
Argentine 11 19 3 33 3 1
U
Chilean
French
German
Spani sh
British
Rio Gallegos
Qvner Renter Empl
U 2
Total
Totals for Territory
Owner Renter Empl . Total
5
6
lU
1
5
1
1
1
6
8
20
39
13
19
7*
31
6
11
10
21
33
15
lU
8
31
29
60
38
37
126
93
Total
Foreign
Argentine
29
10
6
16
5
1
U0
17
182
83
8U
53
98
22
36U
158
VI
Source: Comisi6n Nacional del Censo Terrer
Censo Nacional . Vol
(Buenos Aires, 1915) PP- 7*0-1.
.,ot.: The Census provided ^r°* ^t^^^e^lZXZ
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APPENDIX IV
SHIPMENTS TO BUENOS AIRES OF UNCOMBED WOOL FROM THE FOUR
PORTS OF SANTA CRUZ«*
TONS PESOS
1818 201 202 ,26U
1919 1720 1,576,806
1920 2505 2,030,581
1921 80lU 2,U71,U50
1922 3622 829, 0U7
1923 1663 735,596
Source: Direccion General de Estadfstica Anuari
o
. (Buenos
Aires, 1922) p. 696. Anuario . (Buenos Aires, 192U)
p. 726.
AVERAGE PRICE OF TEN KILOS OF WOOL (ALL TYPES ) 1910-1923 IN PESOS
1910 $10 1918 $30 1922: $8
1915 15 1919 28 1923:
1916 20 1920 22
1917 28 1921
Source: Col. J. M. Sarobe La Patagonia y sus problemas . (Buenos
Aires, 1935) p. 138.
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APPENDIX V
LIST OF DEMANDS PRESENTED BY THE WORKIFGMEN ' S SOCIETY OF RIO GALLEGOS
NOVEMBER 1, 1920 TO THE RANCHERS OF SOUTHERN SANTA CRUZ
:
1. The ranchers are obligated to improve the general living condi-
tions as soon as is reasonably possible according to the following:
a. No more than three men shall sleep in one four-by-four meter
room, and they shall sleep on beds or cots with mattresses,
not on sheep skins. The rooms shall be veil ventilated and
disinfected every eight days. A wash stand and water shall
be provided in each room so that workers may wash after re-
turning from their jobs.
b. Light shall be provided at the owner ' s expense. A package of
candles shall be distributed to each worker every month . In
each sitting room a stove, lamp, and benches shall be provided
by the owner.
c* Saturday afternoon shall be. reserved for washing clothes. If
necessary, another afternoon may be substituted.
d. The evening meal shall consist of soup, main dish, dessert,
and beverage.
e. The mattress and bed shall be provided at the owner's expense,
but clothing shall be the worker's own responsibility.
f. In case of especially high wind or rain, no worker shall be
required to work out-of-doors, excepting cases of obvious
emergency
.
g. Each sheep station should have a first aid kit with
instruc-
tions in Spanish.
h. The owner is obligated to provide transportation to
the point
where a worker was recruited if he should be fired or
simply
let go.
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The ranchers are obligated to pay their workers a minimum
wage of 100 pesos in national currency plus food. No
s alary shall be reduced that currently exceeds this amount
.
It shall be left to the discretion of the owner exactly what
amount each worker receives, on the basis of ability and
performance
•
Each cook shall have one helper for every twenty men
being served and a bread baker when more than forty are being
served.
Permanent employees who leave the ranch during drives
shall receive twelve pesos a day with horses, and temporary
help shall receive twenty pesos a day but must provide their
own horses. Horsebreakers shall receive twenty pesos for each
horse tamed
.
The ranchers are obligated to place at each station one or
more shepherds depending on its importance, establishing a
"biweekly inspection to attend to the needs of the occupants.
In choosing workers for the stations, preference shall be
given to workers with families, to whom certain benefits shall
be provided in relation to the number of children. In this
way the population will grow and the country will be settled.
The ranchers are obligated to recognize and do recognize the
Workingmen's Society of Rio Gallegos as the only entity
representative of the workers. The ranchers are also obligat-
ed to accept the designation of a delegate on each
ranch who
shall serve as intermediary with the ranchers and
with the
Workingmen's Society and shall be authorized to settle
urgent
questions in a provisional manner that affect the
rights and
duties of both workers and employers.
5« The rarchers shall assist in having all their workers become
members of the Workingmen's Society, but they are not
obligated to require union membership, or to hire only union
members
.
6. The Workingmen's Society is obligated to terminate the
present strike and urge all members to return to their jobs
immedi ately after this agreement is signed.
7. The Workingmen's Society promises to use every means to
promote harmony between labor and capital, inculcating its
members with the spirit of order, hard work, and mutual
respect
.
8. This agreement shall take effect as of November 1, and all
employees who return to work shall be credited with his due
pay during the days missed. There shall be no retaliation on
either side
•
Source Jose Maria Borrero,
1957) PP. 21U-217.
La Patagonia Tragica ( Buenos Aires
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